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3 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 
Summary
The coronavirus pandemic has marked the most significant test of the way that the UK 
Government takes and acts on scientific advice in living memory.
The scientific community—in academia, in the public sector and in industry—has risen 
to that challenge in extraordinary and, in many cases, unprecedented ways.
This Committee, on behalf of the House of Commons, is deeply grateful for the tireless, 
expert and unstinting work of everyone who has sought to understand the threat of 
covid-19 from its earliest appearance, and who have brought their experience, ingenuity 
and judgement to bear on mitigating its impacts and seeking treatments and vaccines 
against it.
The high reputation of UK science is founded on openness and relentless self-
challenge—looking always to test current theories and practices against new evidence 
and explanations, without sentiment and with a relish for discovery.
The Science and Technology Committee in its continuing inquiry has sought to apply 
that same spirit. Through asking questions of expert witnesses and scrutinising written 
evidence our aim has been to do two things:
• Distil from a necessarily complex and evolving response to a previously
unknown virus lessons that can usefully be learned—positive and negative—
that can be put into practice to help decisions yet to be taken, both in the
remaining course of the pandemic and beyond; and
• Capture contemporary evidence from what the people taking decisions, those
advising them and those working on the response to the pandemic thought
at the time, so that future inquiries need not be only through the lens of
hindsight.
In May, the Committee wrote to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Care with some recommendations drawn from the experience of the 
first few months of the pandemic.1
This Report considers, specifically, the ways in which the Government has obtained and 
made use of scientific advice during the pandemic to date.
During the weeks ahead, both as the Science and Technology Committee and in our 
joint “lessons learned” inquiry with the Health and Social Care Committee, we will 
set out further evidence and findings on areas including the test and trace system, the 
development of vaccines and the preparedness for this emergency.
In particular, the remarkable achievement of developing and being in a position to deploy 
multiple vaccines against a deadly and virulent virus that was completely unknown a 
little over a year ago ranks as one of the most outstanding scientific accomplishments 
of recent years—we will consider the lessons to be learned from the scientific, public 
policy and administrative contributions to this success in a subsequent Report.
1 Correspondence from Chair to the Prime Minister regarding lessons learned so far from the covid-19 
pandemic, 18 May 2020 (Annex One)
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This Report is structured as follows:
In Chapter two, we consider how scientific advisory and key decision-making structures 
evolved in the early stages of the pandemic, through evidence we gathered from Chief 
Medical and Scientific Advisers, as well as the Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Care.
Chapter three explores the initial awareness of the novel coronavirus in the UK 
Government as well as the activation and operation of SAGE itself. While it is apparent 
to us that science advisory mechanisms responded quickly, there is an open question 
regarding the longer-term operation of SAGE and the impacts on the independent 
experts who participate—and their research staff and technicians—as well as the 
Government officials who support SAGE.
The transparency and communication of science advice is discussed in Chapter four. 
While it is regrettable that there were initial delays in the publication of SAGE evidence, 
minutes and the disclosure of expert advisers, we are pleased that a regular drumbeat 
of public information was eventually established. Nevertheless, we have concerns 
that the lessons from this experience have not been consistently applied, and call for 
the Government to publish the advice it has received on indirect effects of covid-19 
(including impacts on mental health and social wellbeing, education and the economy) 
and work to improve transparency around the operation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre.
In Chapter five, we discuss the breadth of expertise drawn upon by the Government 
through SAGE. We conclude that there was a particular reliance on epidemiological 
modelling expertise at the beginning of SAGE’s operation—reflecting the paucity of 
real world data early in the pandemic—and identify an apparent gap in the provision 
of independent advice on non-medical impacts. We also consider the issue of poor data 
flows, which have hampered the work of SAGE and other experts in understanding the 
pandemic.
Our final Chapter presents a number of instances that exemplify how effectively 
science advice was used, in different policy areas, over the course of the pandemic. In 
Chapter six we consider the following examples in which science advice has been a key 
component: testing capacity; social distancing measures, such as face coverings; and the 
development of potential vaccines and therapeutics.
Key findings
Our overall conclusions are that:
1. During the first part of the pandemic, the Government was serious about taking 
and following advice from scientists of international repute, through a structure that 
was designed and used during previous emergencies.
2. The length of the pandemic to date has placed extraordinary demands on the 
scientific advisers to Government. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser, the Chief 
Medical Officers, their teams, ministers and officials in Departments, the devolved 
administrations, the NHS, public health teams in Public Health England and local 
authorities, and each of the participants in SAGE and its sub-groups have worked 
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intensively and continuously since the beginning of the pandemic. The structures for 
science advice in emergencies have been based around shorter term emergencies and 
the Government should consider the resilience of the arrangements for when they are 
needed to ensure in the longer term.
3. Initially, there was a lack of transparency about who were the scientists who 
served on the Government’s advisory body, SAGE, and what evidence and scientific 
papers their advice drew on. This has been improved following our earlier letter to the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser, but there is still insufficient visibility as to what 
advice was given to the Government and over the transparency of the operation and 
advice of the new Joint Biosecurity Centre.
4. Although the Government was advised by many experts of distinction, and 
generally followed the advice that was given, the outcome during the first wave of the 
pandemic is not regarded as having been one of the best in the world.2
While the experience of no country is perfectly comparable with others, it will be 
important to understand the reasons for this in order to learn lessons for the future. In 
this Report, there are questions of how quickly scientific analysis could be translated 
into Government decisions; whether full advantage had been taken of learning from the 
experience of other countries; and the extent to which scientific advice took as a given 
operational constraints, such as testing capacity, or sought to change them.
5. Measures taken to contain the pandemic had wider and indirect effects, such as 
on people’s livelihoods, educational progress and mental and emotional wellbeing. The 
assessment of these wider impacts was—and remains—much less transparent than the 
epidemiological analysis; the people conducting the analysis and giving advice are less 
visible than epidemiological modelling advisers; and its role in decision making opaque.
6. The public has benefitted from seeing and hearing directly from scientists advising 
the Government, and overall trust in science has remained high despite the inevitability 
that scientific advice has often been associated with restrictions on people’s activities 
and sometimes the focus of contention. As the Office for Statistics Regulation advised, 
in order to maintain high levels of confidence, data and statistics should be presented 
in ways that align with high standards of clarity and rigour—especially when they are 
used to support measures of great public impact.
7. A fully effective response to the pandemic has been hampered by a lack of data. 
For a fast-spreading, invisible, but deadly infection, data is the means of understanding 
and acting upon the course of the virus in the population. The early shortage of testing 
capacity—restricting testing only to those so ill that they were admitted to hospital—
had the consequence of limiting knowledge of the whereabouts of covid-19. The ONS 
Infection Survey did not begin until May, and the fragmentation of data across public 
organisations has impeded the agility and precision of the response.
2 Sir Patrick Vallance told us in July it was “clear that the outcome in the UK has not been good” and that there 
was a “band of countries that have done less well” (Q1043). Further, Professor Neil Ferguson suggested to us 
in June that the UK’s position, in terms of per-capita deaths from covid-19, would not “necessarily change in 
a European setting” (Q942).
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8. The increase in testing capacity that took place from April was driven principally 
by a target set by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care rather than following 
a scientifically-based plan of what capacity was needed. While testing capacity has 
increased dramatically, it is still unclear what exact assessment has been made of the 
testing targets required in the management of the pandemic.
In each instance, the approach we have taken is to draw on the evidence that has been 
presented to the Committee, orally and in writing, and to draw out lessons by way of 
recommendations to the Government—which is required to respond formally to the 
Report.
Where recommendations reflect findings that things could have been done better we 
make them, in keeping with the scientific approach, not to apportion blame but— 
recalling the acute uncertainty and urgency with which decisions have had to be 
made—but to provide a means continually to improve our collective response to this, 
and future emergencies.
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1 Introduction
Covid-19
1. A coronavirus is a common type of virus that can cause intestinal and respiratory
illness in humans and animals, with symptoms including fever, coughing and more severe
issues including pneumonia. Seven different coronaviruses have been found in humans,
which mostly cause cold-like symptoms, except for the viruses that cause severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and covid-19.3
2. The emergence of a novel coronavirus, previously unseen in humans, was first
reported in the city of Wuhan in China on 31 December 2019.4 The first case of the novel
disease outside of China was reported on 13 January in Thailand.5 On 22 January, the
World Health Organisation (WHO) issued a statement saying there was some evidence of
human-to-human transmission.6 On 30 January 2020, the WHO declared the outbreak
a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’.7 On 31 January 2020, the first two
cases of covid-19 were confirmed in the UK (in England).8 The first death from covid-19
in the UK (in England) was announced on 5 March.9 On 11 March, the WHO “made the
assessment that covid-19 can be characterized as a pandemic”.10
3. The International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses (responsible for naming
all new viruses) named the 2019 coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and the disease caused by the
virus was named covid-19 by the WHO.11 In this Report we use covid-19 to refer to the
disease and ‘coronavirus’ to refer to the virus.
Our inquiry
4. On 10 March 2020, we held a wide-ranging private briefing to gain an overview of
the scientific understanding of covid-19 and to explore issues relating to diagnostics,
therapeutics and vaccines.12 On 20 March the Committee launched a call for written
evidence as part of our inquiry, UK Science, Research and Technology Capability and
Influence in Global Disease Outbreaks. We sought views relating to a number of issues in
relation to managing a disease outbreak.
5. Between 25 March and 3 November 2020, we held 15 public evidence sessions. We
took evidence from over 50 individuals, including the Secretary of State for Health and
Social Care, Matt Hancock MP, the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick
Vallance, Chief Medical Officers from the four nations of the UK, Public Health England,
NHS England, participants of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, those
3 UK Research and Innovation, Coronavirus: the science explained, accessed 4 December 2020
4 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020
5 World Health Organisation, WHO statement on novel coronavirus in Thailand, 13 January 2020
6 World Health Organisation, Mission summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan, China, 22 January 2020
7 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020
8 GOV.UK, CMO confirms cases of coronavirus in England, 31 January 2020
9 GOV.UK, CMO for England announces first death of patient with COVID-19, 5 March 2020
10 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020
11 World Health Organisation, Naming the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and the virus that causes it, accessed 4 
December 2020
12 Science and Technology Committee, Committee scrutinises UK response to COVID-19 outbreak, 20 March 2020
 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 8
involved in developing vaccines and treatments and many others.13 We received over 100 
pieces of written evidence from a similarly broad range of individuals and organisations.14 
We are grateful to all those who provided oral and written evidence to our inquiry.
6. Recognising that further scrutiny of the pandemic would be necessary over the 
winter months, on 8 October we launched a joint inquiry with the Health and Social Care 
Committee into coronavirus: lessons learnt.15 This Report does not cover that work.
Aims of this Report
7. In this Report we focus on the science advice provided to the UK Government leading 
up to November 2020 and we also analyse the Government’s response to it. While some 
of the evidence we have considered applies to the whole of the United Kingdom, much of 
our commentary focuses on the decisions and actions of the UK Government and public 
bodies in England.
8. The purpose of this Report is not to apportion blame, nor is it to give an overall 
verdict of how the UK has performed—the time for such an evaluation will come. We 
therefore seek in this Report to take a balanced, objective and constructive approach, 
highlighting where things could have and should have been better, where the Government 
has taken the right approach, and identifying where the Government has the opportunity 
to learn lessons for future phases of handling the virus in the UK.
9. Our decision to take evidence during a live emergency scenario—with its inherent 
uncertainty—was deliberate. The reasons for this are to identify lessons to apply 
immediately, as described above, but also to ensure that there is a public record of the 
decisions and assessments made throughout the pandemic, so that future scrutiny does 
not need to rely on recollections and hindsight. This is also why in May we wrote to the 
Prime Minister with some of our initial findings (see Annex One for a copy of the letter).16
10. Our efforts as a Committee have, as reflected throughout this Report, focused 
predominantly on the scientific and technical advice that was drawn upon in the 
early stages of the pandemic. We have also taken a great interest in understanding the 
interventions taken in other countries, as scientific evidence and discussion are global by 
nature and therefore there may be appropriate learnings to take from the experiences of 
others. While scrutiny of the operational aspects of dealing with the novel coronavirus 
are rightly the reserve of other departmental Select Committees, we believe it is important 
that we consider how operational decision-making and advice have been structured during 
this period, so that we may reflect more fully on whether scientific advisory mechanisms 
have been fit for purpose.
13 Transcripts of our oral evidence sessions can be viewed here: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/91/
uk-science-research-and-technology-capability-and-influence-in-global-disease-outbreaks/publications/oral-
evidence/
14 Written evidence received as part of our inquiry can be viewed here: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/91/
uk-science-research-and-technology-capability-and-influence-in-global-disease-outbreaks/publications/written-
evidence/
15 Health and Social Care Committee and Science and Technology Committee, Parliamentary Committees join 
forces: Inquiry launched to scrutinise Government response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 8 October 2020
16 Correspondence from Chair to the Prime Minister regarding lessons learned so far from the covid-19 pandemic, 
18 May 2020
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11. In this Report:
• Chapter two explores the advisory and decision-making structures within 
Government and their evolution throughout the pandemic;
• Chapter three considers logistical aspects of the Scientific Advisory Group for 
Emergencies (SAGE), including its activation and operation;
• Chapter four explores the transparency of science advice and advisers, including 
how effectively advice was communicated to Government decision-makers and 
the public;
• Chapter five discusses the nature of the scientific advice supplied to the 
Government, including the breadth and diversity of expertise and data 
considerations; and
• Chapter six considers a number of policy areas in which science advice has 
been a key component: testing capacity, social distancing measures, such as face 
coverings, and the development of potential vaccines and therapeutics.
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2 Expert advice and Government 
decision-making structures
12. The United Kingdom is home to one of the most accomplished scientific bases in 
the world,17 and houses experts in many fields relevant to the coronavirus pandemic, 
including social science, epidemiology, public health and clinical studies.18 As such, the 
Government has had the opportunity to capitalise on a wide range of expertise from the 
very outset of the pandemic.
13. Decision-making structures in Government, and the mechanisms for science advice, 
have evolved throughout the covid-19 pandemic as the nature of the response has shifted 
from initial crisis management to long-term and ongoing management of the disease. In 
this Chapter, we set out the mechanisms of science advice and decision-making at the 
heart of the UK Government, with particular attention to central Government and the 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).
Scientific advisory structures in the pandemic
UK Government
The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)
14. SAGE is the primary mechanism responsible for providing “timely and coordinated” 
scientific and technical advice in emergency scenarios to Cabinet Office Briefing Room 
(COBR) meetings.19 The role of COBR is discussed later in this Chapter (see paragraph 
27). The covid-19 pandemic marked the ninth occasion for which SAGE has been activated 
since 2009—when the group was first conceived after the Scientific Advisory Panel on 
Emergency Response was dissolved—and the fourth time the group has been convened in 
that period to consider an infectious disease-related health emergency.20,21
15. SAGE meetings throughout the pandemic have been co-chaired by the Government 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, and the Chief Medical Officer for England, 
Professor Chris Whitty, with the secretariat operated through the Government Office 
for Science. SAGE’s first “precautionary” meeting was held on 22 January 2020, 13 days 
after China reported to the WHO that an outbreak of pneumonia cases in Wuhan was 
caused by a novel coronavirus.22 We also note reports that COBR, which SAGE reports to, 
was initially chaired by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with the Prime 
Minister chairing his first COBR meeting on 2 March.23 The current iteration of SAGE 
17 UK Government, International Comparative Performance of the UK Research Base, October 2017; UK 
Government, International Comparison of the UK Research Base: Accompanying note, July 2019
18 UK Government, SAGE explainer, 5 May 2020
19 GOV.UK, About the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, accessed 25 September 2020
20 Science and Technology Committee, Third Report of Session 2010–11, Scientific advice and evidence in 
emergencies, HC 498, March 2011
21 SAGE was previously active during the 2009 Swine Flu pandemic, the 2014 Ebola outbreak and the 2016 Zika 
outbreak. Science advice during the Swine Flu pandemic (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/
cmselect/cmsctech/498/49802.htm) and Ebola outbreak (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/
cmselect/cmsctech/469/46902.htm) were considered by predecessor Science and Technology Committees.
22 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 26 November 2020
23 UK Government, PM to chair COBR meeting on the coronavirus outbreak, 2 March 2020
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marks the longest period over which the group has remained activated since 2009—in the 
period between 22 January and 3 November, the date of our last evidence session as part 
of this inquiry, SAGE had met sixty-four times, often twice weekly.24
16. Explaining the function of SAGE during the pandemic to the Joint Committee on
the National Security Strategy, Sir Patrick indicated that the operation of SAGE was
“slightly more complicated” than its formal role of reporting to the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat—the body within the Cabinet Office responsible for the coordination of
planning and response to civil emergencies—and COBR alone:
The Cabinet Office has established a structure for dealing with Covid with 
a central team based in the Cabinet Office and ministerial committees that 
take accountability—plus, of course, there are lead departments, the most 
central of which is the [Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC)]. 
The output from SAGE goes to all departments. It goes to the Cabinet Office 
Covid task force and will feed into the ministerial committees. It will also 
go obviously to the DHSC. It is worth saying that there are other forms of 
scientific advice that feed in through departments, and each of the chief 
scientific advisers in the departments will listen to SAGE and take their 
own information back to departments. Many of them will have their own 
advisory boards feeding into specific questions in departments—they are 
much more operational than SAGE would be. The DHSC has its own forms 
of scientific advice to feed in, as well.25
Scientific advisory committees
17. Government guidance on SAGE from 2012 has indicated the likely need for SAGE to
establish sub-groups:
To enable SAGE to both review and validate research and undertake new 
assessments, analysis and modelling it is likely to be necessary to create sub-
groups. The effective use of sub-groups can also help ensure that discussion 
groups within SAGE are of a manageable size.26
18. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser outlined in a letter to the Committee in
April that SAGE had taken advice from a number of groups.27 The expert groups discussed
in the letter included a number of pre-existing advisory groups that were co-opted from
the Department of Health and Social Care:
• the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) (40–45
participants);
• the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Behavioural Science (SPI-B) (18
participants); and
24 GOV.UK, SAGE minutes
25 Oral evidence taken before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on 19 October 2020, (Q43)
26 UK Government, Enhanced SAGE guidance, p.16, October 2012.
27 Letter from Sir Patrick Vallance to the Chair of the Committee on SAGE composition dated 4 April 2020. Number 
of participants in these groups is correct as at the time of Sir Patrick’s letter
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• the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG)
(16 participants).28
Further information on the sub-groups feeding into SAGE was subsequently published 
on 4 May.29
Chief Scientific Adviser network
19. The UK Government’s network of departmental Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) exists 
to provide an “independent challenge function to their department” and “are mechanisms
in place to ensure that policy making is underpinned by science and engineering.”30
20. Professor Alan Penn, CSA to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local
Government, outlined to us how CSAs were guiding the decision-making process in the
context of the coronavirus pandemic:
The way I would interact is generally in informing policy colleagues within 
the Department about the science and the evidence, as I understand it, 
coming from SAGE to help to ensure that when it is drawing up policies 
to go up to Cabinet Office for decision it is taking account of the science.31
21. Departmental CSAs have frequently attended SAGE meetings, either as participants
or observers, and some more than others depending on their area of expertise. For example, 
Professor John Aston told us in May that he had attended almost all previous SAGE
meetings “partly in my role as chief scientific adviser at the Home Office, but partly in my
role as a professor of statistics at Cambridge and so as a statistician”.32 However, Osama
Rahman, Director of Analysis and CSA to the Department for Education indicated that
his attendance of SAGE meetings had been less frequent and only “whenever things to do
with children or schools have been discussed.”33 Nevertheless, Professor Penn suggested
that CSAs were available to attend any SAGE meetings relevant to their scientific expertise
or their CSA duties.34
The Joint Biosecurity Centre
22. On 1 June 2020, the Government established a new Joint Biosecurity Centre (JBC)—
first announced by the Prime Minister in May35—as a directorate within the Department
of Health and Social Care.36 The UK Government covid-19 recovery strategy, published in
May, outlined the two main functions of the JBC:37
28 (i) https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/scientific-pandemic-influenza-subgroup-on-modelling; (ii) https://
www.gov.uk/government/groups/independent-scientific-pandemic-influenza-group-on-behaviours-spi-b; (iii)
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/new-and-emerging-respiratory-virus-threats-advisory-group
29 GOV.UK, List of participants of SAGE and related sub-groups, accessed 12 October 2020
30 UK Government, Guidance for government Chief Scientific Advisers and their Officials, p.6, January 2020
31 Professor Alan Penn, Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Q497)
32 Professor John Aston, Chief Scientific Adviser, Home Office (Q541)
33 Osama Rahman, Director of Analysis and Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Education (Q489)
34 Professor Alan Penn, Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Q490)
35 UK Government, Prime Minister’s address to the nation, 10 May 2020
36 UK Government, Joint Biosecurity Centre, published 24 September 2020, accessed 6 October 2020
37 UK Government, Covid-19 Recovery Strategy, p41, May 2020
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a) an “independent analytical function” to provide real-time analysis of infection
rates across the country, in addition to advising the four UK Chief Medical
Officers of a change in the covid-19 Alert Level; and
b) a “response function” that would “identify specific actions to address local spikes
in infections, in partnership with local agencies”.
23. The Government have stated that the JBC “complements” the work of SAGE, supporting 
the work of the advisory group with “operational capability, including data analysis and
epidemiological expertise”. Nevertheless, we note that in October the Government Chief
Scientific Adviser suggested to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that
the JBC could function as a replacement for SAGE in the longer term:
As things become more chronic problems, it is rather important that 
departments pick up the running of [operations]. The [Department of 
Health and Social Care] has done a lot, which is part of why organisations 
like the Joint Biosecurity Centre have come into play: because there needs 
to be a longer-term, more stable system with internal government science 
providing advice into it, plus getting its own external input, rather than 
thinking that you can run this from SAGE for the whole time. SAGE is an 
advisory body built up largely from external academics. It is not part of the 
government operational machinery and certainly cannot run for very long 
periods.38
Science advice in the devolved nations
24. We heard about how the devolved nations had established complementary structures
to SAGE. With regard to the Scottish Government Covid-19 Advisory Group,39 Dr Gregor
Smith, Interim Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for Scotland, told us that while an early
relationship with SAGE was “very useful […] as time progressed it was becoming apparent
that a lot of the discussion was increasingly focused on the English context and models were 
being applied in the English context”. Nevertheless, Dr Smith indicated that the Scottish
advisory group was “very much complementary to the existing SAGE structures” and
benefitted from reciprocity of information.40 The CMO for Northern Ireland, Dr Michael
McBride, told us that the executives in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland had
drawn up a “memorandum of understanding” covering topics including “modelling and
behavioural science and issues relating to research ethics”.41 Dr Frank Atherton, CMO for
Wales, described to us that a “technical advisory cell”42 had been established in the Welsh
Government to “translate [SAGE advice] into the Welsh context”.43
25. In terms of the potential impact on policy decisions, the Royal Society of Edinburgh
suggested to us that while it had noted “increasing levels of divergence across the four
nations in the policy response to the pandemic”, this was likely due to “differing policy
priorities, approaches, timeframes and operational capabilities as opposed to conflicting
scientific advice”.44
38 Oral evidence taken before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on 19 October 2020, (Q44)
39 Scottish Government, Scottish Government COVID-19 Advisory Group, accessed 10 December 2020
40 Dr Gregor Smith, Chief Medical Officer for Scotland (Q271)
41 Dr Michael McBride, Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland (Q275)
42 Welsh Government, Technical Advisory Cell, accessed 10 December 2020
43 Dr Frank Atherton, Chief Medical Officer for Wales (Q277)
44 Written evidence submitted by the Royal Society of Edinburgh (C190103)
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26. The four CMOs of the UK expressed in evidence to us that regular liaison between
the four nations was taking place at the expert adviser level. For example, Dr Gregor
Smith explained in April that the CMOs spoke “at a minimum three times a week” and
took “various opportunities to ensure that we link with one another through senior
clinician groups or through more ad hoc meetings” depending on urgency.45 Further,
Professor Chris Whitty indicated that the CMOs all interacted regularly with “our own
chief scientific advisers to Government”.46
Key decision-making structures in the UK Government during the 
pandemic
Cabinet Office and COBR
27. COBR—named after the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms—is the high-level body
responsible for coordinating central Government decision-making in response to
emergencies and is the body responsible for activating SAGE.47 COBR brings together
Ministers and senior officials from relevant UK Government departments and agencies
along with representatives from other relevant organisations.
28. The Institute for Government (IfG), an independent think tank, has produced a
series of infographics giving an overview of how decision-making in central Government
evolved throughout the first six months of the coronavirus pandemic in the UK (see
Figure 1).48 The IfG identified four main phases, with the Government introducing
‘ministerial implementation groups’ before shifting to a structure coordinated by two
Cabinet Committees:
45 Dr Gregor Smith, Chief Medical Officer for Scotland (Q269)
46 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q270)
47 UK Government, Responding to emergencies: The UK central government response, p.21, April 2013
48 Institute for Government, UK Government coronavirus decision making: key phases, 29 June 2020
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Figure 1: The evolution of Government decision-making structures in the early months of the 
covid-19 pandemic.
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Phase 2 of UK government coronavirus decision making: March
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Phase 3 of UK government coronavirus decision making: mid-March to mid-May
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Phase 4 of UK government coronavirus decision making: mid-May to June
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Source: Adapted (with permission) from the Institute for Government
29. It is apparent that in the first few months of managing the pandemic, decision–
making was focused within the centre of Government. For example, it was made clear to
us by MHCLG’s CSA Professor Alan Penn that “decisions by and large have been taken
centrally at Cabinet Office level”, with Osama Rahman—the Department for Education’s
CSA and Director of Analysis—offering an example from early in the pandemic:
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the decision to close schools and a suite of further social distancing measures 
was a Cabinet decision with advice from SAGE. It was fed through to 
Cabinet via Patrick Vallance and the chief medical officer.49
30. Decision-making has shifted initially from COBR to other structures within the
Cabinet Office. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Matt Hancock MP,
suggested to us in July that the majority of decision-making had been “replaced” by “a
permanent Cabinet Committee structure to deal with cross-Government decisions
relating to coronavirus”:
there is a Covid-O, which takes the operational decisions and meets two 
or three times a week, and then that reports into Covid-S, which takes the 
strategic decisions and is chaired by the Prime Minister.50
While the Secretary of State did not state when this change took place, the membership of 
the two new Cabinet Committees was published on 29 June 2020.51 Further, the Secretary 
of State indicated that these committees were supported by their own secretariat, and not 
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, which is responsible for supporting COBR.52
Other decision-making structures
31. Guidance on containing and managing local coronavirus outbreaks—first published 
by the Government on 17 July—describes a “Local Action Committee command structure” 
which sits under COVID-O to consider national and local epidemiological information.53 
The command structure is split into three tiers:
• a Local Action Committee (gold), chaired by the Secretary of State for Health 
and Social Care;
• a Weekly Containment Group (silver), also chaired by the Chief Medical Officer; 
and
• a Daily Containment Group (bronze), with a “rotating” chairship.
32. While this Report does not include a detailed discussion on the effectiveness of local 
decision-making, we note that the guidance claims that local authorities will be able to 
draw upon “analytical support and advice” from the Joint Biosecurity Centre and Public 
Health England.
33. The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency 
advisory and decision-making structures in living memory. As such, it is important 
that lessons are drawn throughout and applied so that the Government and future 
Governments may be better placed to respond to future crises. This has been the 
purpose of our inquiry—to capture those early lessons in the course of the pandemic. 
The machinery of science advice and decision-making has evolved throughout the 
Government’s management of the covid-19 pandemic, however there is an 
open question regarding the long-term sustainable and efficient provision of 
science 49 Professor Alan Penn, Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Q497); 
Osama Rahman, Director of Analysis and Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Education (Q495)
50 Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Qq1192–1206)
51 UK Government, List of Cabinet Committees and their membership, 29 June 2020
52 Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Qq1192–1206)
53 UK Government, Containing and managing local coronavirus (covid-19) outbreaks, accessed 13 October 2020
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advice to Government. Further, it remains unclear—in the long term—what role the 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) will play, and—as alluded to by the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser—how organisations such as the Joint Biosecurity 
Centre will provide a solution to the provision of science advice to Government in 
the coronavirus pandemic and beyond. We are concerned that at the present time 
the operation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre and the advice that it gives is not fully 
transparent. The Government, whatever organisational structures it decides upon, 
should commit to publishing the scientific advice it receives unless there are matters of 
national security (see paragraphs 59 to 64). The Government should outline in response 
to this Report how it intends for science advice on the novel coronavirus to operate in the 
longer-term management of the pandemic and what roles will be played by new bodies 
including the National Institute for Health Protection and the Joint Biosecurity Centre, 
alongside SAGE.
34. The Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science should update SAGE 
guidance to set out the role that SAGE will play in advising the Government’s long-term 
management of emergency scenarios.
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3 Activation and operation of SAGE
Timeliness of coordinating SAGE and science advice
35. The purpose of mechanisms such as SAGE and COBR is to ensure that the delivery of 
scientific advice to decision-making is in step with the rapid nature of how an emergency 
unfolds. While the timing of advice and decisions on specific interventions will be 
discussed in later Chapters, this Chapter considers the broad timing of scientific advice 
from the outset of the pandemic.
Initial awareness of the outbreak in China
36. In our initial public hearing in March, Dr Richard Horton, editor of the Lancet, 
expressed his concern that the Government had not responded rapidly to the emerging 
threat in China:
what strikes me is the mismatch between the urgent warning that was 
coming from the frontline in China in January and the, honestly, somewhat 
pedestrian evaluation of the likely severity of the outbreak in [SAGE] 
evidence.54
Dr Horton suggested that three Lancet academic papers detailing the outbreak in China—
published on 24, 30 and 31 January—did not appear to have been considered by SAGE.55
37. However, at the same meeting Sir Patrick Vallance indicated that advisers in central 
Government were aware of the issue in January:
very early on there were two things that could happen […] Either China could 
contain this completely and it would go away—that was one possibility—or 
they would not contain it and it would spread and become a pandemic […] 
Early in January, it was not clear which of those would be the case.56
Further, Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for England, informed us 
that he first discussed the news of the emerging outbreak with one of the deputy Chief 
Medical Officers on 2 January.57 Sir Patrick also told us in March that by the time the 
WHO had officially declared the crisis as a pandemic situation on 11 March, the UK 
Government was already “planning that it would go across the world”.58
38. This is supported by the first “precautionary” SAGE meeting being held on 22 January 
2020,59 less than one month after China reported the first cluster of coronavirus cases and 
eight days before the World Health Organisation declared the outbreak a Public Health 
54 Dr Richard Horton, Editor-in-Chief of The Lancet (Q39)
55 (i) Wang, C. et al., A novel coronavirus outbreak of global health concern, The Lancet, 24 January 2020; (ii) 
Chen, N. et al., Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of 99 cases of 2019 novel coronavirus pneumonia in 
Wuhan, China: a descriptive study, The Lancet, 30 January 2020; (iii) Wu, J T. at al., Nowcasting and forecasting 
the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a 
modelling study, The Lancet, 31 January 2020.
56 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q101)
57 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q330)
58 (i) Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q101) (ii) World Health Organisation, Listings of 
WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020
59 UK Government, Precautionary SAGE 1 minutes, 22 January 2020
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Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).60 Nevertheless, details of this first SAGE 
meeting were not made public for some time, with the minutes alone being published on 
29 May.
Setting up SAGE
39. Written evidence submitted by a collective of University researchers who interviewed 
“senior scientists” advising the Government and its agencies—indicated the view that “the 
UK’s early warning systems for emerging infectious disease, situated in PHE, served their 
purpose well.” However, they also suggested that it took a few weeks to get SAGE set up 
fully. One interviewee told the researchers that processes around SAGE were “extremely 
confused to begin with” amidst advisers joining the group “at a rate of knots”.61
40. Similarly, written evidence submitted by the Royal Society explained that the 
systems needed to coordinate science advice “were not initially in place” and therefore 
the pandemic “initially overwhelmed the UK Government’s abilities to access and 
deploy the UK’s operational science capabilities at sufficient scale and speed”. On the 
Government’s outreach to the wider scientific community—including with the National 
Academies—the Royal Society suggested there was an “unplanned reactive effort”.62 The 
Physiological Society also suggested that opportunities to engage with the Government 
were “piecemeal”.63
Timeliness of advice and decision-making
41. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Matt Hancock MP, told us in July that 
“various SAGE conclusions, especially on lockdown measures or the non-pharmaceutical 
interventions, were followed in a timely manner, in some cases on the same day.”64 Sir 
Patrick Vallance nevertheless impressed upon us in July that “the ultimate decisions are 
a mixture of policy and timing”, which were outside of SAGE’s control and that timing of 
decisions was “a policy question”.65
42. Written evidence from the University of Liverpool and the University of Oxford 
suggested that while “scientific advice to Government was timely […] decisions based on 
it were often delayed, particularly during the earlier part of the crisis (January–April)”. 
Based on interviews with scientists advising the Government, they suggested that “six 
weeks of opportunity was wasted” and pointed to one interviewee’s comments of:
a couple of heated moments [in mid-March] where [scientific advisers] 
were saying “you are not moving fast enough”. The Government’s most 
senior expert advisors, we were told, responded that policy decisions were a 
process, that the politicians needed to be led through it.66
60 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020
61 Written evidence submitted by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research 
Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic Infections, University of Oxford, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health 
Sciences, University of Liverpool, Institute of Infection and Global Health (C190084)
62 Written evidence submitted by the Royal Society (C190110)
63 Written evidence submitted by the Physiological Society (C190061)
64 Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Q1189)
65 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q1040, Q1056)
66 Written evidence submitted by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research 
Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic Infections, University of Oxford, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health 
Sciences, University of Liverpool, Institute of Infection and Global Health (C190084)
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43. We are satisfied that the SAGE mechanism responded to the advent of the novel 
coronavirus in a timely manner and that the most up-to-date scientific research and 
understanding was readily available to inform the Government from the outset. 
Nevertheless, we note that submissions presented to us raised concerns that during the 
early weeks of the pandemic, policy decisions in response to scientific evidence were 
taken more slowly than was needed, given the rapidity of the spread of the virus.
44. It is disappointing that the details of SAGE’s preliminary meetings were not made 
public for over two months, leading to unnecessary concern and confusion over what 
advice the Government had been receiving. Indeed, were it not for our early enquiries, 
this confusion may have continued until the details of SAGE’s initial meetings were 
published at the end of May. We note that SAGE has yet to publish any papers that 
might have been considered in its first two meetings. The Government Office for Science 
should confirm, as soon as possible, whether any papers were considered at the first two 
SAGE meetings and, if so, it should place them in the public domain.
45. We believe the initial response in setting up SAGE was timely. We have heard 
from some sectors of the science community that the community was not consulted 
appropriately. The Government should set out in response to this Report how in future 
emergencies it will engage formally and informally with the community.
Scientific advice
46. We have heard from numerous participants of SAGE—and its sub-groups—that the 
science advisory machinery has operated by conveying a central view, whilst reflecting 
the scientific uncertainty that is associated with covid-19 being an entirely new threat. For 
example, Professor Neil Ferguson set out his view on the role of external advisers in giving 
science advice:
The aim of SAGE is to give the co-chairs sight of the best scientific evidence 
and the uncertainty around specific topics. We are not trying to reduce 
uncertainty; we are trying to convey to [Sir Patrick Vallance] and [Professor 
Chris Whitty] what is known about the science and what the uncertainties 
are, so that they can make a judgment about how they communicate that 
to Ministers.67
Similarly, Sir Patrick Vallance, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, stressed to us 
that with “a number of experts and scientists around a table, you are not going to have 
a discussion in which everyone agrees with everyone else”, pointing out that the group 
challenged views by discussing alternatives and possible outcomes “at every stage of the 
process”.68
47. In terms of relaying scientific advice to decision-makers, Professor Chris Whitty 
indicated that SAGE worked to ensure that the nuance between statistical confidence and 
uncertainty was communicated:
67 Professor Neil Ferguson, Director, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Imperial College London 
(Q8)
68 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q77)
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One of the things you are trying to convey is both the central projection—
this is where on average we think things will go—and the uncertainty 
around that […] you ideally also provide confidence intervals.69
48. Professor Whitty also gave us an insight into why SAGE sought to distil the scientific 
evidence—and its associated uncertainties and differences in expert opinion—to provide 
a central view that maximises its usefulness for Government decision-making:
It is not very useful to Ministers or other decision makers to say, “There are 
16 opinions. Here are all 16. Make up your mind.” Part of the process is to 
say in a unified way, “Here is the central view”, and then, if there are either 
dissenting views or a range of uncertainty quantitatively around that, to 
convey it in a way that is comprehensible to the people who are listening so 
that they understand the certainty with which the advice is being proffered. 
If they do not, it is clearly going to lead to bad decision making.70
Sir Patrick echoed this viewpoint:
What I think is not helpful is to say, “Here are several different views,” and 
ask somebody who is less knowledgeable to bring these together and come 
to a single view. In SAGE, we try to come up with a consensus view, but we 
are always clear and open about how we arrive at that.71
Sustainability of SAGE participation
49. Reflecting on inviting experts to attend SAGE meetings, Sir Patrick Vallance told 
us in July that in general “when people are asked if they would help in a Government 
emergency, the answer is yes. They turn up and work extremely hard at it.”72 However, 
he pointed to the upcoming issue of “how we keep that sustainable for them as the new 
academic term starts”. We also note later comments made by Sir Patrick to the Joint 
Committee on the National Security Strategy that SAGE was “not part of the government 
operational machinery and certainly cannot run for very long periods”.73 Professor 
Robert MacKay, Director of Mathematical Interdisciplinary Research at the University 
of Warwick, highlighted that academic expert advisers had “many other obligations” 
including teaching and administration and as a result colleagues working in epidemiology 
had been “working round the clock.”74 He suggested that mitigating this could involve “a 
number of fellows to be on research contracts with an agreement to be on call in a relevant 
crisis”.
50. Professor Neil Ferguson, who has participated in SAGE and is a member of SPI–M 
(the modelling group that feeds into SAGE), also provided an example of the pressure and 
urgency facing academic advisers in emergency situations:
69 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q282)
70 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q249)
71 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q78)
72 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q1039)
73 Oral evidence taken before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on 19 October 2020, (Q44)
74 Written evidence submitted by Professor Robert MacKay, Director of Mathematical Interdisciplinary Research, 
University of Warwick (C190027)
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Groups contributing to SPI-M will all independently go away and try to 
answer those questions and come back often two days or three days later, 
after working all night, with our best estimate of the answer.75
51. SAGE has been activated for the longest continual period since its inception, 
which brings to question how sustainably the group can maintain its current level of 
high activity. We acknowledge senior scientists’ comments of frequent working round 
the clock, and we pay tribute to their continued service to the public throughout this 
emergency. It is also important to be clear that it is not just the participants of SAGE, 
and its sub-groups, who are managing this workload—it is shared by the colleagues, 
junior researchers and technicians who support them, too, as well as Government 
officials, among others. The Cabinet Office and the Government Office for Science 
should commit to update SAGE guidance to consider what support might be required 
for independent advisers in long-term emergency scenarios, within six months of SAGE 
being deactivated. The Government should identify a way to formally recognise and 
celebrate all those who have contributed to the UK scientific response to the pandemic.
75 Professor Neil Ferguson, Director, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Imperial College London 
(Q894)
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4 Transparency and communication
52. The strength of British science and the prominent role that scientific advice has 
played during the pandemic has been an important source of public information and 
confidence. The regular appearances of the GCSA and CMO at Downing Street press 
conferences have been a public demonstration that scientific advice has been influential 
in Government decisions. However, a central concern of this Committee from the 
beginning of the pandemic has been the initial lack of transparency of the science advice 
being utilised by the Government, and those individuals and bodies responsible for 
giving it. The concern around transparency has also been shared by eminent scientists 
and institutions, as summarised by the Francis Crick Institute in written evidence: “with 
scientists sharing the stage with politicians, there is a need for clear accountability, clarity 
about the governance arrangements and the demarcation of advisory versus decision-
making roles.”76 In this Chapter we explore issues relating to transparency.
Disclosure of science advisers and SAGE participants
53. Early in the pandemic, we called for transparency of the experts attending SAGE 
and the disciplines represented therein, putting our request to the Government Chief 
Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, in our first public hearing and in a subsequent 
follow-up letter.77 Aside from the public confidence that is inspired through transparency 
in decision-making, our purpose in this request has been in the spirit of supporting 
robust decisions. Transparency around scientific advice enables scrutiny and constructive 
appraisal from the wider scientific community, to ensure that decisions made are based in 
as wide and appropriate a range of disciplines and perspectives as necessary.
54. Sir Patrick Vallance responded to our initial request in early April to explain that 
the initial lack of disclosure of SAGE participants was due to advice from the Centre for 
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), which was “in line with the standard 
procedure for COBR meetings”.78 Sir Patrick indicated that this advice concerned 
“safeguarding individual members’ personal security and protect[ing] them from lobbying 
and other forms of unwanted influence which may hinder their ability to give impartial 
advice”. SAGE’s co-chair, Professor Chris Whitty, reiterated this to us in oral evidence in 
April but suggested that the advice from CPNI was not applicable although it “needed to 
be thought through quite carefully”:
We were given quite clear advice from the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure based on the fact that SAGE is a sub-committee of 
Cobra and meets in a range of circumstances, some of which are very much 
security related. This is not. […] There is absolutely no barrier from me or 
from Sir Patrick in principle.79
76 Written evidence submitted by the Francis Crick Institute (C190072)
77 (i) Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Chair, Science and Technology Committee (Qq75–76); (ii) Correspondence from the 
Chair to Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific Adviser, relating to SAGE Membership, 30 March 2020
78 Letter from Sir Patrick Vallance to the Chair of the Committee on SAGE composition dated 4 April 2020
79 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q301)
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55. Details of the advisers participating in SAGE, and its sub-groups, were first published 
on 4 May, over one month after lockdown measures were instigated and over three months 
after SAGE first met.80 It is also worth noting that the SAGE publication scheme, dated 
29 May, indicated that some information would be redacted to “protect the personal data 
of individuals” including junior Government officials and SAGE participants who asked 
specifically not to be named.81 We welcomed this important step towards transparency 
and accountability in our letter to the Prime Minister in May,82 however we noted then 
that there was a lack of clarity between those experts who had formed the ‘core’ of SAGE 
participants and those advisers who were invited to only a few meetings—as Professor Sir 
David Spiegelhalter brought to our attention.83
56. Whilst we welcome the eventual disclosure of SAGE participants, the fact that 
the delay was attributed to advice from the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) gives us cause for concern. As suggested by Professor Chris 
Whitty, the advice relates to emergencies relevant to national security rather than public 
health crises. We therefore conclude that it was not necessary for CPNI advice to have 
resulted in a delay in the public disclosure of SAGE participants of over three months. 
Within three months of this Report, the Cabinet Office should update SAGE guidance 
to stipulate the timeframes in which SAGE should receive advice from the Centre for the 
Protection of National Infrastructure, and other relevant bodies, regarding the public 
disclosure of expert SAGE participants.
57. Regarding the disclosure of Government officials observing SAGE meetings, we 
agree with the redaction of information to protect the personal data of individuals 
including junior officials at the time of the emergency. In the interests of transparency, 
and to have a full picture of who is formulating policy advice to Government during 
the course of the pandemic, it is important that the identities of senior officials and 
political advisers attending SAGE meetings are made public. We also note that the 
minutes of previous SAGEs activated for other emergencies were eventually published 
with full disclosure of all participants and observers. In response to this Report, the 
Government should commit to the full disclosure of the following information on SAGE 
attendees and observers throughout the pandemic:
(1) Civil servants at Senior Civil Service grade;
(2) political and special advisers; and
(3) the representative Government departments and job title of junior officials, in 
lieu of their names.
Further, the Government should commit to the full disclosure of all individuals who 
attended SAGE meetings—and their affiliations—within three months of the current 
SAGE being stood down, or by the end of 2021, whichever is the earlier.
80 GOV.UK, List of participants of SAGE and related sub-groups, accessed 12 October 2020
81 GOV.UK, SAGE: Coronavirus response - publication scheme, 29 May 2020
82 Correspondence from Chair to the Prime Minister regarding lessons learned so far from the covid-19 pandemic, 
18 May 2020
83 Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter, Chair, Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, University of 
Cambridge (Q468)
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Other advisory groups
58. We note that in the early stages of the pandemic, the membership of other advisory 
groups was not made public in a consistent manner. While the membership of the New and 
Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group has remained public throughout, 
the membership of the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) was 
public knowledge leading up to the covid-19 pandemic,84 but was hidden at the height of 
its initial spread throughout the UK85 and remained so until the list of SAGE participants 
was made public on 4 May 2020.86 Further, the membership of the then Scientific Pandemic 
Influenza Group on Behaviours (SPI-B) remained secret up until 4 May.
Joint Biosecurity Centre
59. With the establishment of the Joint Biosecurity Centre in June 2020, it was unclear 
initially how scientific expertise and advice would be utilised by the nascent organisation. 
A paper on the JBC considered at SAGE in May, and published in June, indicated that 
functions of the organisation would include monitoring and analysing the “numbers 
and pattern of cases and outbreaks of covid-19 nationally and locally in England and 
the Devolved Administrations” in addition to “deciding what responses are required”.87 
Further, the paper suggested that the JBC should “consider the different economic and 
social factors” that affect individuals’ behaviour in its analyses.
60. Information published towards the end of September on GOV.UK indicated an intent 
for the JBC to “build close partnerships with the academic and scientific community”,88 
further stating that such collaborations would “ensure that advanced mathematical and 
statistical models of the state of the epidemic in the UK are able to inform policy in an 
auditable and robust fashion.”
61. Speaking to us in early September, Dr Thomas Waite, Director of Health Protection 
at the JBC, gave us further insight into how the JBC would operate:
The idea behind JBC is to bring together experts from across Government. 
There are many epidemiologists, public health experts and so on in the 
national public health agencies of the UK, and we bring in data analysis 
skills, data science skills and data infrastructure skills to pull all that 
information together in a systematic fashion to help inform both local 
decision making and national decision making by the Secretary of State 
and so on.89
62. In a letter to the Committee, dated 12 October, Baroness Harding, Interim Executive 
Chair of the new National Institute for Health Protection, explained that the JBC was “part 
of DHSC […] and [was] not dissimilar to the many analytical divisions and directorates 
across government that provide insight to support policy making within government 
departments”.90 She further stated that the JBC was “very different to SAGE, who are an 
advisory committee independent of government […] [and] therefore does not produce 
meeting minutes in the same way as SAGE”.
84 GOV.UK, Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling dated 24 July 2019
85 GOV.UK, Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling dated 24 March 2020
86 GOV.UK, List of participants of sage and related sub-groups, dated 4 May 2020 (NB SPI-B is now known as the 
Independent Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours)
87 GOV.UK, Note on Joint Biosecurity Centre and potential flows, 20 May 2020
88 UK Government, Joint Biosecurity Centre, published 24 September 2020, accessed 6 October 2020
89 Dr Thomas Waite, Director of Health Protection, Joint Biosecurity Centre (Q1276)
90 Correspondence from Baroness Dido Harding to the Chair, regarding follow up evidence, 12 October 2020
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63. Nevertheless, the Government has indicated that the JBC had established a “technical 
board”, tasked with ensuring that “JBC products are of sufficient clinical and scientific 
rigour”, comprising the Chief Medical Officers and Chief Scientific Advisers of the four 
UK nations and “other relevant experts”. In addition, it was confirmed that a “data science 
advisory board” had been established to guide “the highest standards of reliability and 
reproducibility”.91 As of this Report, the Government has disclosed information on the 
experts that constitute these advisory boards and committed to publish the minutes of the 
data advisory board, the first of which were published in early December.92
64. The paper considered by SAGE in May recommended that the JBC “should pursue 
a reputation as an organisation that the public can trust. This will require them to be 
an exemplar in terms of honesty, openness, competence and independence”. The paper 
stated that this was a “fundamental point” and “should be embedded into every level of 
the organisation and demonstrated to the public from day one.” It is regrettable that 
full transparency was not achieved in time for the JBC’s inauguration on 1 June. We 
welcome the disclosure of the expert advisory boards supporting the JBC. Nevertheless, 
the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has yet to commit to publish the 
outputs, including meeting papers and minutes, of all the JBC’s established boards. 
It would appear that the Government has not learned fully from the public concern 
resulting from the initial delays in publishing SAGE information. The Department of 
Health and Social Care should commit, within a month of this Report, to publish the 
relevant outputs—including terms of reference, meeting papers and meeting minutes—
of the steering and advisory boards supporting the JBC. DHSC should also set out how 
regularly these boards will meet and when relevant papers can be expected to be in the 
public domain—preferably within a fortnight of each meeting.
Communicating science advice to Government decision-makers
65. Whilst it is crucial that science advice to Government is structured and coordinated 
well in emergencies, this effort is limited in value if the evidence is not communicated in 
a way that it can be most usefully considered alongside the many other factors that feed in 
to policymakers’ decisions.
66. Another important aspect is the delineation of advice and decision-making. Sir 
Patrick summarised his views for us in July:
Of course, the ultimate decisions are a mixture of policy and timing, which 
are not in our control […] what I can be absolutely clear about is that those 
making policy and decisions have heard and understood the scientific 
advice […] It is difficult to say, “Yes, that is based entirely on science advice,” 
because it is not; it is based on other things as well.93
However, an alternate view was put to us by researchers at the University of Liverpool and 
University of Oxford, in relation to the initial interactions between expert advisers and 
Government officials:
91 UK Government, Joint Biosecurity Centre, accessed 26 November 2020
92 UK Government, Joint Biosecurity Centre, accessed 8 December 2020
93 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q1040)
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policy makers would say, “what should we do?” And [scientists] say “well 
what do you want to achieve?” And we just go round and round in circles 
[…] ‘Just going round in circles’ was the situation when policy makers only 
wanted to ‘follow the science’: things improved markedly once they had 
clear policy goals and began to seek scientific advice on the effectiveness of 
different ways to reach them.94
The researchers also pointed to a more concerning conclusion:
some of our interviewees began to fear that Ministers were shifting the 
accountability for hard decisions onto them. A top Government advisor 
asked some of them: “what is it the PM has to say?” […] and wrote it down—
even to details, which the Prime Minister later used, like “you can’t go to 
the pub”.
67. Nevertheless, Sir Patrick assured us that the independent experts providing scientific 
advice had done so “freely and frankly”. When asked for examples of where Government 
decision-making had taken a different view to that put forward by advisers he commented:
it is not a straightforward yes or no [….] Clearly, if the Government had 
done something about which we said, “You should not do that,” we would 
stand up and say, “You absolutely should not do that, in our opinion, from 
the science”.95
68. On occasion, scientific and medical advice to Government has informed the adoption 
of strict measures such as the second national lockdown order, which was announced by 
the Prime Minister on 31 October.96 When we questioned the Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser and the Chief Medical Officer for England on whether the advice behind such 
measures was in practice “not optional”97 because a prediction that the NHS would be 
overwhelmed could never be gainsaid, Professor Whitty responded that their advice did 
not go so far as to say “this is definitely going to happen on this date”:
People who give that degree of certainty have not understood how modelling 
of [covid-19 cases and NHS bed capacity] with scenario uncertainty properly 
works.98
However, Professor Whitty further commented that:
the chances that things are likely somehow to improve without action 
between now and the next few months are quite low. If you are giving 
advice to Ministers, that has to be the advice you give. […] Ministers then 
have to make decisions not just on that advice. They have to use multiple 
other things that have big social and economic impacts. […] it is important 
that these deeply difficult societal measures fundamentally are decided by 
Ministers.99
94 Written evidence submitted by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research 
Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic Infections, University of Oxford, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health 
Sciences, University of Liverpool, Institute of Infection and Global Health (C190084)
95 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Qq1041–1042)
96 UK Government, Prime Minister’s statement on coronavirus (covid-19), 31 October 2020
97 Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Chair, Science and Technology Committee (Q1443)
98 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q1446)
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69. Given the frequent reporting of the views of SAGE advisers in the media—
particularly where these have diverged from decisions taken by the Government—and 
the continued public interest in the evidence base underlying decisions made, we are 
satisfied for the most part that the demarcation between adviser and decision-maker 
has remained intact. If we are to fully understand the extent to which the Government 
has been guided by scientific and medical expertise, then we must see the science advice 
that is reflected in the papers and meeting minutes published by SAGE. This advice must 
also be taken in the context of other advice and evidence submitted to Government—
only then will the full justification for the Government’s actions be understood. The 
Government should publish the science advice given by the Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser and Chief Medical Officer for England to COBR and the Prime Minister to date, 
and commit to the disclosure of future SAGE advice within two months of it being given, 
or the policy being decided, whichever is the later.
Transparency of evidence and advice to Government
70. Science advice is one facet of the wide array of inputs that have informed Government 
decisions throughout the pandemic. Government guidance on SAGE indicates that 
“transparency is an important element of democratic decision making and the evidence 
used to inform decision should be published.”100 Explaining the importance of transparency 
in decision-making, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics highlighted that “governments must 
be transparent not only about the scientific evidence that they are taking into account, but 
also about the values and judgments that are inevitably involved in decision-making”. 
However, regarding the Government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, they cited 
a “concerning lack of transparency” in how scientific evidence fed into policy decisions.101 
While SAGE sought faithfully to distil a central view, as in many areas of inquiry there is 
a range of views of scientists, as shown by the formation of groups such as that founded by 
a former Government Chief Scientific Adviser.102
71. The need for transparency in communicating the scientific evidence considered by 
SAGE and Government decision-makers was made acute by reports in March that a single 
modelling report by the Imperial College covid-19 Response Team—led by Professor 
Neil Ferguson—had persuaded the Government to “change course” in its handling of 
the disease.103 SAGE first began publishing the evidence it had considered on 20 March,104 
which notably listed the Imperial College report as the sole entry under “specific pieces of 
modelling on interventions provided to SAGE”.105
72. The next substantial collection of SAGE evidence was published on 5 May—over 
one month after the initial evidence set—and the minutes of SAGE meetings began to 
be published from 29 May—four months after the group’s first meeting and over two 
months after the nationwide lockdown had been instigated.106 When we wrote to the co-
100 UK Government, Enhanced SAGE guidance, p.26, October 2012
101 Written evidence submitted by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (C190062)
102 Science magazine, U.K. government should not keep scientific advice secret, former chief adviser says, 11 May 
2020
103 BBC News, Coronavirus: UK changes course amid death toll fears, 17 March 2020
104 GOV.UK, Scientific evidence supporting the UK Government response, accessed 10 October 2020
105 GOV.UK, Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE): Coronavirus (covid-19) response, dated 20 March 
2020
106 GOV.UK, Government publishes SAGE minutes, 29 May 2020
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chairs of SAGE to inquire why a second delay had occurred,107 we were told that the SAGE 
secretariat was processing a “very substantial volume” of evidence but that they aimed to 
“establish regular publishing cycles on an approximately monthly basis”.108
73. With reference to the decision to publish evidence, Sir Patrick Vallance explained to 
us that previously SAGE had not published evidence until after the respective emergency 
had concluded, and so the decision to publish during the coronavirus pandemic required 
some consideration, leading to the delay:
It is important that we get the evidence out there. It took us a while to get 
it into the right shape to get it out there and get permission from people, 
because we were reliant on the papers you mentioned that had come from 
them and were attributed to them […] That change to the way SAGE works 
is one that I personally welcome.109
74. Professor Chris Whitty further explained that other operational considerations were 
a “huge pressure” facing the SAGE secretariat and much of the evidence considered by the 
group was at “a very early stage of development”:
In ordinary academic circumstances, you would not put them out until they 
had been peer-reviewed and brought into final form and, in many cases, 
got through a publication process. That has also provided delay in certain 
circumstances. As a scientist, I think that is right. We need to get things in 
an incredibly timely way in SAGE. On the other hand, we do not wish to 
put into the public domain stuff that has not yet got to the point where it 
has been properly completed and, ideally, peer-reviewed in the usual way 
for proper critique.110
Nevertheless, SAGE guidance stated that while the “most appropriate timing” for the 
publication of information was “often” after the emergency, the appropriate timing required 
consideration. The guidance also pointed out that one learning from the 2009 Swine flu 
pandemic was “the value of using experts to communicate key scientific and technical 
issues, as they were [publicly] perceived as trusted and credible sources of information.”111
Non-SAGE evidence and advice
75. Public understanding and scrutiny of Government decision-making is also 
dependent on the transparency of the entire evidence base underlying it. Speaking to 
us in early November, Sir Patrick reinforced the point that advice to Government is not 
solely scientific, telling us that SAGE “exists to provide the science advice” while “the 
Treasury and the Cabinet Office bring in the other parts of the equation, particularly on 
the economy”. He suggested, however, that while SAGE advice was “very clearly in the 
public domain”, the other advice drawn upon by the Government was “less visible”.112
107 Correspondence from the Chair to Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer, and Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief 
Scientific Adviser, relating to SAGE Publications, 20 April 2020
108 Correspondence from Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer, and Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific 
Adviser, relating to SAGE Publications, 23 April 2020
109 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q103)
110 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q297)
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76. At its fifty-eighth meeting on 21 September, SAGE noted the importance of economic 
assessments alongside scientific consensus:
All the [non-pharmaceutical] interventions considered have associated 
costs in terms of health and wellbeing and many interventions will affect 
the poorest members of society to a great extent. […] Policy makers will 
need to consider analysis of economic impacts and the associated harms 
alongside this epidemiological assessment. This work is underway under 
the auspices of the Chief Economist.113
Despite that, speaking to the Treasury Committee on 11 November, Clare Lombardelli, the 
Chief Economic Adviser at HM Treasury, said that the Treasury had “not done a specific 
prediction or forecast of the restrictions” but rather provided an “ongoing analysis” of 
economic factors:
What we instead do is iterative economic analysis of policy that the 
Government are considering. We consider a whole range of data and 
analysis as part of that. A lot of that is in the public domain, as you would 
expect. We look at, for example, what has happened to the economy over 
the recent period.114
77. On 30 November, the Government published its analysis of the health, economic and 
social effects of covid-19 and the approach to tiering,115 ahead of a motion in the House 
of Commons to approve further Regulations on 1 December.116 The analysis referred 
to three broad scenarios, projected by the Office for Budget Responsibility, for how the 
coronavirus might impact the UK economy.117 However, the analysis also indicated that 
no attempt had been made to estimate the economic impacts of specific interventions as 
such analysis would involve “such wide uncertainty as to not be meaningful for precise 
policy making.”118
Communicating science advice to the public
Government communications
78. We note that from the outset, the Government has sought to emphasise the medical 
and scientific advice that has informed its response to the coronavirus, particularly though 
the widely televised press conferences at Number 10.119 Nevertheless, communicating 
science advice to the public requires some careful forethought, with an appreciation of the 
wider context in which policy decisions are made. As Health Secretary Matt Hancock MP 
stressed to us in July:
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I always argue that we are guided by the science, because you take into account 
the scientific evidence and then you also take into account everything else. 
The key feature of how that works is that SAGE is a body that advises the 
CMO and the CSA and they, in turn, advise Ministers. Whether that is 
through COBRA or the Covid-O structure that we have now, the advice 
from SAGE comes to us and comes to me as Health Secretary through the 
CMO and the scientific advice through the CSA, and they also take into 
account wider considerations in that advice. I then take into account all the 
considerations in the official policy advice that I get from the civil service.120
Nevertheless, a significant number of scientists, research institutions and scientific 
organisations wrote to us to express their concerns that the boundary between science 
advice and decision-making has not been communicated effectively. These concerns have 
coalesced in particular around the use of the phrase ‘following the science’, as exemplified 
by comments from the Royal Society that “considering science advice is not the same as 
simply ‘following the science’” (see conclusion at paragraph 69).121
79. The presentation of data and statistics around the pandemic has been an active area of 
interest in our work (see Box 1). The line between advice and decision-making was tested 
when the Prime Minister announced plans for a second ‘stay at home’ order on 31 October.122 
Although the Chief Medical Officer and Government Chief Scientific Adviser presented 
modelling data at the press conference alongside the Prime Minister, the data underlying 
this was only made public three days later and was subject to extensive criticism, including 
that the data was out-of-date.123 For example, on 5 November Ed Humpherson, Director 
General for Regulation at the Office for Statistics Regulation, wrote to Sir Patrick Vallance 
to caution that the lack of transparent and timely information carried the “potential to 
confuse the public and undermine confidence in the statistics.”124 When we raised the 
issue of the potential for this data, and how it was presented, to confuse those without 
scientific backgrounds, Sir Patrick explained that it was “certainly not the aim” but that it 
was difficult to convey what might happen.125
80. Nevertheless, speaking more generally, Professor Sir Ian Diamond, the National 
Statistician, indicated to us in May that the Office for National Statistics (ONS) had officials 
“embedded in Government communications” to ensure that graphs and figures presented 
by the Government were “statistically sound”, suggesting that “over time we have seen an 
improvement” in communication.126
120 Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Q1189)
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Box 1—Government reporting of death statistics
Professor Chris Whitty outlined to us in April that there were “four forms” of health 
impacts from covid-19:
There are direct deaths from Covid with the NHS working well. There are indirect 
deaths because of the NHS becoming overwhelmed […]The third one is indirect 
deaths caused by downscaling other public health services […] The final one […] is 
that we all know there is a gradient between health and deprivation […]that will 
have a health effect.127
The reporting of death statistics has evolved throughout the pandemic. Before 29 April, 
the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) reported only deaths in hospitals 
from those with a positive covid-19 test.128 On 29 April, a “new method” of reporting 
daily deaths was announced to include “deaths that have occurred in all settings” 
where an individual had tested positive for covid-19.129 The Government’s reporting 
of death statistics changed again in August—following an “urgent” review by Public 
Health England—to count deaths within 28 days of a positive covid-19 test.130 This 
followed “concerns raised by academics from the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine 
about the original measure, which counted anyone who had ever tested positive as a 
covidassociated death.”131
Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter, Chair of the Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence 
Communication at University of Cambridge, suggested to us in May that the early 
reporting of hospital deaths alone had been “really inadequate” prior to being 
“upgraded”.132 Nevertheless, he pointed out that DHSC-reported data left out those 
“who died of covid who had not been tested”, but noted that this was addressed in data 
from the Office for National Statistics (ONS).133 Professor Spiegelhalter indicated that 
the efforts of the ONS to produce new data and analyses had been an “extraordinary 
achievement”.134
81. Several of the epidemiological modelling experts, including Professor Neil Ferguson, 
who fed into central Government decision-making said to us that “more certainly could be 
done” to communicate information to the public, but that there were practical limitations.135 
Professor Matt Keeling from the University of Warwick told us that:
we are all really interested in public communication of science. When you 
are working 24-hour days to try to get models up and running and you 
have teams running in parallel, you just do not have time to do public 
communication as well. Maybe this is a lesson for the future that we need 
to do more public communication beforehand.136
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82. Nevertheless, written evidence submitted by UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) 
suggested that public opinion of science advice had remained strong. UKRI told us that 
“overall, the public want more scientific information on covid-19 – just 13 percent say 
there is too much”,137 based on polling conducted by Ipsos MORI that also indicated that 
58% of the adults surveyed believed the scientists advising on covid-19 were trustworthy.138
General science communication
83. A number of written evidence submissions pointed to the significant efforts of the 
wider scientific community—including non-departmental public bodies—in engaging 
with the public to communicate scientific topics as clearly as possible. For example, 
UKRI pointed to their efforts in launching a “coronavirus explained website” in March 
to “provide authoritative and up-to-date explanations of the scientific evidence behind 
the covid-19 pandemic to the UK public”.139 Further, the Health Research Authority 
(HRA), a regulator of health and social care research, told us that it had “established a 
process where we publish the summary of all covid-19 [clinical] research within three 
days of approval.” The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) was 
“supportive” of the HRA’s efforts to make such “lay summaries” freely available.140 Outside 
of official channels, the Institute of Development Studies said that “some of the most 
effective forms of communication and support around covid-19 are grassroots solutions 
being generated through digital platforms e.g. local Facebook groups” and that “sharing 
of visual representations of data via digital platforms are also helping transcend linguistic 
barriers”.141
84. In relation to media reporting of scientific research into covid-19, we understand 
that a tension exists between presenting information that is scientifically robust and that 
which is up to date. This issue is reflected in our discussion on the decision to publish the 
evidence used by SAGE (see paragraph 74), and is further outlined in written evidence 
supplied to us by the British Pharmacological Society:
Prior to the pandemic, this was not common practice as pre-prints were 
not a focus of the general media. Clearly it is important to be open and 
transparent about research and ensure its findings are available to all as 
soon as possible. However, it is also important to stress that these pre-prints 
were not peer-reviewed and therefore need to be assessed critically rather 
than taken at face value. Consequently, as journalists have been keen to 
report on these non-peer-reviewed studies, balanced comment from experts 
has been necessary - even if to make the point that a study is inconclusive, 
and more research is needed. Finally, even the peer-reviewed literature base 
will create conflicting evidence that is not always easy interpret when it 
comes to informing future research. Communicating emerging research 
must be done with an appreciation of the inherent uncertainty associated 
with scientific research.142
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85. The balanced reporting of new, non-peer-reviewed research involves active 
participation of the academic community in public discourse. The Royal Society of 
Edinburgh told us that there was “a need for active promotion of experts to the media 
by science organisations” to “ensure the coordination and rapid mobilisation of scientific 
commentary from reputable and responsible experts”.143
86. Transparency in the evidence behind Government decisions enables higher 
quality decision-making through scrutiny, and better understanding of the reasons 
for those decisions. While calls for the publication of SAGE evidence from this 
Committee and many others were eventually heeded, it is regrettable that a significant 
amount of time passed before a regular publication rhythm was established. However, 
we acknowledge that in emergencies, where evidence is subject to great uncertainty, 
careful thought must be given to the way information is communicated and presented, 
given the context at the time. During those crucial early weeks of the pandemic—in 
which important decisions were made by the Government—public understanding 
and scrutiny was hampered by a lack of transparency. For example, when details of 
the 16 March Imperial College report were made public, it was not known what other 
evidence was being considered by SAGE and the Government. It is regrettable that a 
repeat of this scenario occurred on 31 October, ahead of the second national lockdown 
in England, where there was a delay in publishing the data behind the modelling 
used by SAGE. Presenting a graph to the public including a scenario of 4,000 deaths 
per day—based on out-of-date information and without a clearly marked source—
risked, as indicated by the Office for Statistics Regulation, causing public confusion 
and undermining confidence in the statistics, and in our view, causing public alarm 
beyond what was justified. We agree with the assessment of the Office for Statistics 
Regulation and urge the Government and its advisers to ensure that analysis selected 
for public presentation meets high standards of rigour and relevance.
87. It has been made clear to us that policy decisions throughout the coronavirus 
pandemic have not been based solely on medical and epidemiological science, but 
rather have been developed with a wide range of inputs that include scientific research 
and opinion. Nevertheless, as indicated by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, 
while the scientific analysis informing the Government’s interventions has enjoyed 
a great level of public exposure, the analysis and advice outside of SAGE (including 
economic and social considerations) have been “less visible”. It is disappointing 
that the Treasury had “not done a specific prediction or forecast of the restrictions” 
implemented, or those not pursued, but rather provided an “ongoing analysis” of 
economic factors, despite SAGE indicating that social and economic impacts should 
factor into such decisions. It is understandable that these analyses are subject to 
significant uncertainty, however by analogy the epidemiological modelling published 
by SAGE, too, is uncertain and should not to be interpreted as a strict predictor of 
what will happen. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, publish the advice it 
has received on the potential indirect covid-19 impacts (e.g. economic, social and other 
health impacts) of the interventions it has undertaken, alongside the evidence base for 
that advice and should continue to commission such research.
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88. The public has shown a strong appetite for more information. The Government 
should attempt to quantify the four forms of health impacts identified by Professor 
Whitty. Further, it should consider whether it is possible to provide an analysis of—
either consistently or on a sample basis—those who died with covid-19 as distinct from 
those who died from covid-19.
89. As indicated by the Chief Medical Officer for England, the SAGE secretariat 
faced “huge pressure” in managing the monumental task of organising SAGE whilst 
adhering to the principles of transparent and scrutable scientific advice. We commend 
the efforts of officials in the Government Office for Science, the SAGE secretariat 
and independent advisers in their efforts to establish a regular rhythm of publicly 
available information, and hope that this is taken forward as a key learning for 
future emergencies. The Cabinet Office should work alongside the Government Office 
for Science to update SAGE guidance to incorporate the lessons learned for managing 
transparency during emergencies, taking account of:
a) the potential volume of information;
b) the publication and communication of non-peer-reviewed research informing 
SAGE;
c) the potential length of time over which SAGE is activated; and
d) the potential impacts on public trust.
90. We applaud the dedication with which the scientific community within the UK 
and globally have directly engaged with the public, in addition to their intensive 
studies of the coronavirus itself. We are also grateful to those within universities and 
research institutes for their efforts in supporting the clear and direct communication 
of the science of covid-19. These efforts have helped ensure that the trust of the British 
public in the strength of independent science advice has remained high during the 
pandemic, and we hope that these efforts are supported so that they may continue. We 
note, however, that a balance needs to be achieved so that Government decisions are 
not seen to be entirely science-led. The Government Office for Science should work with 
Government departments and public bodies, such as UK Research and Innovation, to 
identify the lessons to be learned from the Government’s communication of science—
drawing also upon the experiences of researchers and their respective institutions. These 
lessons should be reflected within updated SAGE guidance, including a consideration of 
the support that SAGE participants may require for effective public communication and 
engagement during emergencies.
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5 Nature of the scientific advice to 
Government
91. Having examined different aspects of the science advisory process earlier in this 
Report, this Chapter considers the main issues around the nature of the scientific advice 
drawn upon by the Government in the early stages of its management of the coronavirus 
pandemic. One key aspect of this has been the breadth of expertise represented at SAGE 
meetings and in other scientific advisory groups. This is in part why we called for the 
disclosure of information on scientific advisers throughout the early stages of pandemic.
Initial breadth of scientific expertise
92. When the Government Chief Scientific Adviser and the Chief Medical Officer for 
England wrote to us in early April to give an overview of the expertise feeding into SAGE, 
they explained that a range of areas of expertise were represented on SAGE: “molecular 
evolution, epidemiology, clinical science and practice, modelling emerging infectious 
diseases, behavioural science, statistics, virology and microbiology”.144 However, several 
witnesses have suggested that there was a heavy emphasis on epidemiology and modelling 
in the science advice relayed to central Government. For example, Professor Johan 
Giesecke, Former State Epidemiologist for Sweden and Professor Emeritus at Karolinska 
Institute, suggested that “epidemiologists and modellers had too great a power” in both 
the UK and Sweden in the early phase of the pandemic.”145
93. We further note public comments made by Professor Mark Woolhouse, one of the key 
epidemiologists advising SPI-M and the Scottish Government covid-19 Advisory Group, 
that he thought “scientific advice [was] driven far too much by epidemiology”.146 Speaking 
to us in June, Professor Woolhouse provided further clarification that:
In the early stages of the epidemic, before we had large amounts of [public 
health] data, [advice] was largely on the basis of modelling, and that is all 
right and proper and as it should be, but we are looking literally at only one 
side of the equation when we do that.147
He suggested that the “other side” of the equation included “the harms done by lockdown” 
including impacts on “mental health and social wellbeing, the education of our children 
and our economy.”148 Nevertheless, Professor Neil Ferguson—another eminent scientific 
adviser involved in modelling the pandemic—suggested to us in the same meeting that 
SAGE’s approach had “evolved over time quite a lot” and was “a lot more diverse”.149 He 
stated further that “modelling has an important role to play, but clearly it is just one of 
many scientific inputs.”
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Multi-disciplinary advice
94. Aside from the disciplines discussed above, we have received a notable amount of 
written evidence regarding a perceived lack of representation across other relevant Science, 
Technology, Engineering, Maths and Medicine (STEMM) fields of study. For example, 
some of the viewpoints expressed to us include that:
a) public health science had been “underutilised”;150
b) there were “concerns around the representation of immunology expertise”;151
c) there was “room to enhance” the use of engineering expertise and advice;152
d) early in the pandemic there was a “lack of involvement of established corona-
virologists who might have been able to grasp more quickly the potentially 
complex symptomology, immuno-pathology and epidemiology of the virus”;153 
and
e) the “government itself could have done better in listening to and responding to, 
needs and alternative views outside of ‘Golden Triangle’ Universities”.154
In March, Dr Richard Horton expressed his concern to us that there was an apparent lack 
of public health and clinical input into SAGE.155 However, Sir Patrick Vallance robustly 
rejected the suggestion that SAGE did not have sufficient clinical representation:
both the Government chief scientific adviser—me—and of course the CMO 
are medics. We also have the NHS medical director on SAGE itself. We have 
a number of clinicians around the table, including some from Public Health 
England, so quite a proportion of SAGE is clinical, but—it is an important 
“but”—there is a clinical subgroup within SAGE and they are all clinicians. 
They do a lot of the work on modelling the clinical aspects.156
95. Further, evidence submitted by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the Institute 
of Development Studies discussed the importance of social science perspectives in 
informing decision making, with the latter stating that SAGE had “minimal social science 
representation and is largely confined to narrow behavioural science perspectives” which 
compared “unfavourably” with other European countries. The Institute also suggested that 
more expert input was required from the fields of “anthropology, geography, sociology, 
economics, history and related fields.”157
96. However, speaking to our Committee and the Health and Social Care Committee in 
November, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care suggested that criticisms that 
the diversity of SAGE expertise was too narrow were “not an accurate description”:
150 Written evidence submitted by the Academy of Medical Sciences (C190102)
151 Written evidence submitted by the British Society for Immunology (C190093)
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we absolutely listen to a broad range of advice. The formal way in which the 
SAGE advice is brought to Ministers is, quite properly, through the CSA 
and the CMO. We listen very carefully to them. I also listen to all sorts of 
voices and scientific arguments.
The Secretary of State further commented that he did “not think that having engineers 
and operational skills and capabilities on SAGE would be right at all”, indicating that 
advice on engineering requirements was delivered “quite separately”.158
97. We note that SAGE guidance indicated that “to ensure the full range of issues are 
considered advice needs to stem from a range of disciplines, including the scientific, 
technical, economic and legal”.159 The provision of expert economics advice to Government 
throughout the pandemic is one issue that we have sought to understand, particularly 
given the wide ranging impact the coronavirus has had on the public as a whole and at 
the individual level. Professor Chris Whitty told us that SAGE was not giving economics 
advice to Government and did not have a “specific economic group”. He also suggested 
that SAGE was “not constituted” to give economics advice and would require a “different 
membership” in order to do so, cautioning that this could expand SAGE’s operation into 
“such a large group that it is almost impossible to do what it is currently doing.” However, 
Professor Whitty acknowledged that SAGE had one participant from Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (HMT)—later identified as the Director of Economics at HMT—who had fed 
in “important insights” due to her “different disciplinary and intellectual background”.160 
Speaking to whether the SAGE mechanism should be replicated for economics advice, 
Professor Whitty stated there was an “entirely legitimate question” but conceded that he 
did not believe he was “the right person to answer that”.161
98. However, speaking to us in November, Sir Patrick Vallance stated his viewpoint that 
economic analysis was “not something that takes place in SAGE, nor should it take place 
in SAGE”.162 He also pointed out that such analysis was taken elsewhere:
It is very clear that SAGE exists to provide the science advice. The Treasury 
and the Cabinet Office bring in the other parts of the equation, particularly 
on the economy. I do not think it is right to think that SAGE would be the 
place that you integrate all of this and come out with a single number.163
We further note the evidence received in Chapter four, concerning the public 
communication of the economic advice given to Government (paragraphs 75–77).
99. Further, Philip Duffy, the Chief Scientific Adviser at HM Treasury, told us in May 
his view that the Treasury had “significant influence” on the questions put to SAGE for 
consideration, and described how HMT was kept up to date on economic impacts:
within the Treasury we have established broad governance to draw together 
our best understanding of the economic and market data but also of what is 
158 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee and the Health and Social Care Committee 
on 24 November 2020, HC 877 (Qq517–521)
159 UK Government, Enhanced SAGE guidance, p.5, October 2012
160 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Qq303–305). See also Philip Duffy, Director-General 
(Growth and Productivity) and Chief Scientific Adviser, HM Treasury (Q789)
161 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England (Q306)
162 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q1466)
163 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q1464)
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happening with the epidemic. I chair a sub-board of that committee, which 
looks at the impact on businesses and companies. The third area that has 
been an absolute priority for the Treasury is to lay its hands as quickly as 
possible on as much realtime data […] we have a very broad realtime dataset 
that can support the Chancellor and Prime Minister in the decisions they 
have had to take over the last few months.164
Mr Duffy also told us he was “nervous” about the suggestion of creating “some form of 
economic SAGE or a social policy SAGE, or some kind of allied group that would look 
at the broader issues” as ministerial decisions had been made with “a combination of the 
best science that we can find and our best analysis of the social, economic and political 
consequences of those choices”. He also expressed that he was “sceptical of the notion that 
a few extra economists would somehow accelerate answers or give us a sense of rigour 
around some of those choices.”165
100. We believe that a gap persists in the transparency of the advice that is given to 
the Government, outside of the auspices of SAGE, particularly on the topic of non-
medical impacts of the pandemic and related Government interventions. While this 
Committee is not advocating the establishment of an “economics SAGE”, we do note 
that SAGE’s remit covers the inclusion of numerous disciplines, including “scientific, 
technical, economic and legal” expertise. Further, it is entirely within the gift of 
SAGE to establish sub-groups to draw in other expertise as necessary. Whilst we have 
been assured that a Treasury official has been present at SAGE meetings, it has been 
stressed to us that SAGE does not issue economic advice and thus such advice must be 
received by Government through other avenues. The Government must, in response 
to this Report, set out how advice to central Government on the indirect effects (for 
instance impacts on mental health and social wellbeing, education and the economy) 
of covid-19, and the Government’s policy response to it, has been structured throughout 
the pandemic, and commit to the public disclosure of the individuals and institutions 
from which it has sought such advice and publication of relevant papers.
Our analysis of SAGE meetings
101. The disclosure of the minutes of SAGE meetings, beginning in May, has enabled 
us to analyse how the number of experts who attended SAGE meetings has evolved 
throughout the pandemic.166 Our analysis has focused on minutes published by SAGE, 
covering meetings in the period of 22 January—29 October, spanning the initial spread 
of the coronavirus in the UK, the first nationwide lockdown and the period leading up to 
the second nationwide lockdown in England. In general, SAGE meetings have increased 
in size throughout the pandemic, with the first thirteen meetings comprising under 20 
participants before steadily growing throughout the first nationwide lockdown to often 
include in excess of 30 individuals (Figure 2).
164 Philip Duffy, Director-General (Growth and Productivity) and Chief Scientific Adviser, HM Treasury (Qq788–792)
165 Philip Duffy, Director-General (Growth and Productivity) and Chief Scientific Adviser, HM Treasury (Qq788–792)
166 We have only included named participants from SAGE meetings, based on minutes available as of 14 December 
2020. Individuals whose names have been redacted are omitted from this analysis.
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Figure 2—Number of SAGE participants at each individual meeting
Source: GOV.UK. Notes: Individuals whose names have been redacted from SAGE minutes (as of 14 December 2020) are 
omitted from this analysis.
Access to data in the development of expert advice
102. According to a 2019 Royal Society report, there is “considerable strength in UK data 
science in academic, industrial, charitable and government sectors”.167 Emphasising the 
importance of data in managing the coronavirus, Sir Patrick Vallance told us that:
One lesson that is very important to learn from this pandemic, and for 
emergencies in general, is that data flows and data systems are incredibly 
important. You need the information in order to be able to make the 
decisions. Therefore, for any emergency situation those data systems need 
to be in place up front to be able to give the information to make the analysis 
and make the decisions.168
Sir Patrick indicated that this was not limited to testing data but also encompassed “basic 
information flows around patients in hospital, rates of admission and rates of movement”. 
However, he suggested that a principal issue in managing the pandemic was that “at the 
beginning there were definitely times when we would have liked data that was difficult to 
get”. While he stated that “data flows are getting much better now”, he pointed out that the 
NHS “does not have centralised data flows on everything you need”.169
103. Sir Patrick later wrote to us reinforce his view that in the “first weeks of the UK’s 
epidemic, it was difficult for SAGE to accurately assess the state and trajectory of the 
outbreak at that time due to the lack of data” pointing to specific issues including:
167 The Royal Society, Dynamics of data science skills, May 2019
168 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q1043)
169 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Qq1045–1047)
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a) that it took until mid-February for the “relevant data sharing agreements [to be] 
signed by modelling groups”, with the first detailed PHE “line list data” being 
provided to modellers on 6 March;
b) that initially “not all SPI-M modelling groups were able to access” data from 
NHS England and that early data “lacked granular detail, such as how many 
patients were new covid-19 admissions, versus potential re-admissions”; and
c) that “comprehensive data on covid-19 in care homes were not available to the 
Government”.170
104. A SAGE meeting on 15 March demonstrated the impact of poor data management in 
the understanding of the disease at the most critical time for the UK:
Owing to a 5–7 day lag in data provision for modelling, SAGE now believes 
there are more cases in the UK than SAGE previously expected at this point, 
and we may therefore be further ahead on the epidemic curve.171
We note that while more data eventually became available through initiatives such as the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) infection survey,172 the National Statistician, Professor 
Sir Ian Diamond, pointed out that the ONS “responded to the first request [they] got” 
from the Government on 17 April. Nevertheless, Sir Ian suggested that the response from 
the ONS—and partners—in initiating the work was rapid, stating that it was “one of the 
most rapid surveys I have ever in my life seen go into the field”.173
105. The difficulties with accessing health data was also made clear to us by Professor 
Carol Propper, Professor of Economics and President of the Royal Economic Society:
There is scientific uncertainty and there is uncertainty within the social 
sciences and economics community [...] The more we can put these ideas 
together, the more we can get as much realtime data as possible and get 
health authorities to release health data, which is very difficult to do on a 
timely basis, the faster we can begin to analyse...It is all about having data 
and ideas and sharing both.174
106. We also had several concerns outlined to us in written evidence, including that:
a) problems occur “at every level, from data collection, curation, storage in 
accessible sharable formats, incentives for sharing, and a lack of competence 
in well-established ways of handling and sharing data that are compliant with 
regulations and address privacy concerns”;175
b) there has been “fragmentation of health data across various organisations such 
as NHS Digital, NHS England and Public Health England”, including “a lack of 
clarity on which organisations hold certain data and how to access data”;176
170 Written evidence submitted by Sir Patrick Vallance (C190111)
171 GOV.UK, Fifteen SAGE meeting on covid-19 13 March 2020, published 29 May 2020
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c) “the devolved nature of UK health systems and their differing legislation has 
made the combination of datasets difficult and has hampered the ability to carry 
out a UK-wide analysis”;177 and
d) the care sector suffers from “different systems collecting different data and a 
poor take up by the care homes and home care sector due to a lack of trust in the 
central and local authorities collecting the data”.178
107. Professor Sylvia Richardson, Director of the MRC Biostatistics Unit and the then 
President-Elect of the Royal Statistical Society, also raised concern that the statistical 
community had been “hampered” in early efforts to access data and analyse the pandemic 
due to the lack of “a central core where all these data can be put together”.179
108. The creation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre sought to provide such a centralised 
data hub, to enable faster, more integrated analysis and decision-making, as suggested by 
Professor Richardson who indicated that the JBC’s creation was an “extremely positive 
move”.180
109. Given the UK’s strengths in statistical analysis and data science, it is regrettable 
that poor data flows, delays in data-sharing agreements and a general lack of structuring 
and data integration across both the health and social care sectors have throttled timely 
data sharing and analysis. For example, it is unacceptable that detailed public health 
data was only made available to modellers from March. The potential consequences 
of this will undoubtedly include slower and less effective decision-making. The 
establishment of the Joint Biosecurity Centre as an effort to centralise data flows to 
manage the pandemic gives some hope, although it is unfortunate that no central 
mechanism to coordinate data was in place at the start of the pandemic. However it 
will only be successful in this mission if it learns from the issues encountered in the 
early stages of the pandemic, such as those raised to us by SAGE, representatives of the 
health and social care sector and the academic and research community. In response 
to this Report, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) should set out an 
action plan that describes what efforts have been made, and will be made during the 
pandemic, to address the poor data access issues raised by the scientific community and 
SAGE and its sub-groups, including a consideration of:
i) agreements and incentives for data sharing;
ii) integration of data flows across the health and social care sectors, 
including public health bodies at the national and local levels; and
iii) integration of data flows across the health and social care systems of the 
four UK nations.
DHSC should also describe what role the Joint Biosecurity Centre will be given to make 
best use of such data flows and outline what support it will receive to achieve this.
177 Written evidence submitted by the Wellcome Sanger Institute (C190066)
178 Written evidence submitted by Care England (C190021)
179 Professor Sylvia Richardson, Director, MRC Biostatistics Unit, University of Cambridge (Q1280)
180 Professor Sylvia Richardson, Director, MRC Biostatistics Unit, University of Cambridge (Q1281)
 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 44
110. We are satisfied that the science advice informing the Government has drawn 
upon some of the best expertise that the UK—and indeed the world—has to offer. We 
acknowledge the initial dominance of modelling expertise on SAGE and believe this 
is a fair reflection of the lack of data at the beginning of the pandemic. We also note 
comments from the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care that SAGE expertise 
was broad enough and that advice from some disciplines—such as engineering—
was given “quite separately”. We also appreciate that sub-groups and other advisory 
structures exist that may feed into Government decision-making, and that the 
composition of SAGE has evolved to incorporate a wider range of disciplines.
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6 Application of science expertise
111. In this Chapter, we draw on a number of instances to consider how the advice and 
expertise of the science community has been applied across policy areas that have been 
important components of the UK Government’s handling of the pandemic. We will return 
to these issues in more detail in future work.
112. One key question for consideration has been whether the UK’s bespoke system for 
science and medical advice to Government has resulted in a different approach for the 
UK, as opposed to a scenario where WHO guidance was used explicitly, with national 
variance. Speaking to us and the Health and Social Care Select Committee in November, 
Professor Devi Sridhar, Chair of Global Public Health at the University of Edinburgh, 
suggested that following WHO advice would have been beneficial:
Q499 Greg Clark: […] On reflection and for the future, in the context of a 
global pandemic, might we be more inclined to follow WHO advice than 
seek to have a bespoke UK system of advice?
Professor Sridhar: I think that is right. Having followed the press briefings 
and technical information since January, I think WHO advice has been 
pretty spot-on.181
Professor Sridhar further commented that there was a question of whether there was a 
“cleverer way out than other countries”. Giving examples, she stated that New Zealand 
had “pivoted” from a pandemic influenza-based plan, following a report of the WHO 
mission to China—led by Bruce Aylward—182 and indicated that Germany had “learnt” 
from the approach of mass testing and early treatment being adopted by the Republic of 
Korea.183
Testing and contact tracing
113. We have been interested throughout the pandemic in the expert advice underlying 
the Government’s approach to testing for covid-19 and contact tracing of potential new 
cases, encompassing both the capacity required to adequately capture the spread of the 
virus and the centralised approach that was adopted by the Government.
SAGE discussions
114. Sir Patrick Vallance, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, assured us in March 
that “the first few meetings of SAGE were almost totally dominated by questions about 
contact tracing, containment, isolation and testing”.184 From the outset the Government 
was aware that testing capacity issues could follow the spread of the coronavirus. For 
example, it was noted at the first SAGE meeting on 22 January that diagnostic testing 
capacity in Wuhan—the epicentre of the pandemic in China—had been “overwhelmed”, 
although at this stage it was perhaps uncertain if and how the virus would spread globally.185
181 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee and Health and Social Care Committee on 24 
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115. Nevertheless, SAGE’s view of the UK’s required testing capacity appears to have 
evolved. Although Professor Chris Whitty emphasised to us in April that SAGE had 
“consistently” called for a “greater capacity to test across the whole of the UK”,186 the 
minutes of SAGE’s 22 January meeting—published on 29 May—concluded that the UK 
had “good centralised diagnostic capacity” for the novel coronavirus,187 with the second 
SAGE meeting of 28 January noting that the UK had a capacity of “400 to 500 tests per 
day”. However, by 4 February, SAGE noted that while “regional diagnostic capability” was 
being built “within weeks”, overall capacity was “limited” and “cannot be substantially 
increased during this winter influenza season”.188
116. By the time of our first public hearing on 25 March, Sir Patrick Vallance shared his 
view that “the emphasis on ramping up testing is key” but suggested that that did not 
mean the UK was “slow in getting off the ground”.189 Professor Neil Ferguson of Imperial 
College London, similarly made it clear in March that “much more widespread testing” 
was required but explained that in the first few months it was “very clear from messages 
from Public Health England [PHE] that we would have nowhere near enough testing 
capacity”.190
117. As a result of low testing capacity in the face of the exponential growth in covid-19 
around the UK, community testing was halted from 12 March to divert capacity for testing 
in healthcare settings.191 Sir Patrick Vallance described this as a “pragmatic reality” as 
there was “not enough testing” at the time.192
118. Widespread contact tracing was also halted on 12 March, coinciding with the 
Government announcing a shift in strategy from ‘contain’ to ‘delay’.193 This was 
reflected in SAGE minutes from 18 February which noted that “when there is sustained 
transmission in the UK, contact tracing will no longer be useful”.194 The SAGE minutes 
also highlighted that, at the time, “PHE can cope with five new cases a week (requiring 
isolation of 800 contacts)” but that modelling suggested this capacity could be increased 
tenfold.195 Professor John Newton, then national coordinator of the UK coronavirus 
testing programme, indicated to us in May that the decision to stand down contact 
tracing and testing was “a Government decision”.196 This was echoed by Professor John 
Edmunds, Professor of Infectious Disease Modelling, who suggested that decisions on 
contact tracing capacity were “operational” rather than “epidemiological”, but noted that 
“if you leave the epidemic at a high level, and you have the same level of resources, those 
resources will not be sufficient to contain the epidemic”.197 Speaking to us in July, Sir 
Patrick Vallance indicated that “it was very difficult to scale [contact tracing] on the basis 
of what Public Health England was able to do at the time”.198
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119. The Government launched the NHS Test and Trace service on 28 May, in order to “help 
identify, contain and control coronavirus, reduce the spread of the virus and save lives.”199 
In the 2020 Spending Review—published on 25 November—the Government announced 
a total of £37 billion for “Test and Trace and Mass Screening” over the financial years 
2020–21 and 2021–22.200 Nevertheless, a paper considered by SAGE in late September 
emphasised that while “an effective test, trace and isolate (TTI) system is important to 
reduce the incidence of infections in the community” it concluded that the current test 
and trace system was “having a marginal impact on transmission.”201 When we discussed 
this with the CMO and GCSA in November, Professor Whitty implied that while contact 
tracing “will probably be having a bigger effect now” than earlier in the pandemic, it was 
clear that “even under perfect conditions, test and trace takes only a proportion of the R”.202 
Sir Patrick Vallance further commented that “even very effective test and trace systems do 
not work well at high prevalence.”203
120. In early December the National Audit Office (NAO) published its interim report 
The Government’s approach to test and trace in England, which concluded that NHS Test 
and Trace had an “unusual organisational relationship with the Department [of Health 
and Social Care], with unclear accountability”, potentially bringing “risks of confused 
decision-making.” The NAO report also indicated that while NHS Test and Trace “initially 
focused on increasing central capacity” for testing and tracing of cases and contacts, it 
had nevertheless “sought ongoing local engagement”.204 Correspondence from Baroness 
Harding—received as part of our coronavirus: lessons learnt inquiry with the Health and 
Social Care Committee—indicated that while £1.5 billion and £431 million had been spent 
on centralised testing and contact tracing respectively (up to and including September 
2020), £312.5 million had been allocated to local authorities to cover “local test, trace and 
contain activities”.205
Capacity targets
121. On 2 April, Matt Hancock MP, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, 
announced a target of 100,000 tests per day by the end of that month,206 which was later 
clarified to us as comprising “swab tests that detect the presence of the virus”.207
122. The 100,000 test per day goal appears to have been set without direct advice from 
scientific advisers or public health officials. Speaking to us in April, Professor John 
Newton, then national coordinator of the UK covid-19 testing programme, suggested 
that the goal was “not a SAGE target” and that he was not aware where the Secretary 
of State for Health and Social Care, Matt Hancock MP, obtained advice in setting the 
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target.208 The detail of the goal was also uncertain, with Sir David Norgrove, Chair of the 
UK Statistics Authority, urging the Secretary of State to “show more clearly how targets 
are being defined, measured and reported”.209
123. When we pursued the reasoning behind the 100,000 testing target with Mr Hancock 
in July, he agreed that the goal was a ‘personal initiative’ and explained it was informed by 
departmental projections:
The 100,000 target was chosen because that was close to our internal goal. 
Our internal projection for the end of April, when I set the 100,000 target at 
the start of April, was just over 100,000 tests a day.210
Sir Chris Wormald, the Permanent Secretary at the Department of Health and Social 
Care, further commented that:
You should not read too much into what the scientists do and do not 
say about the target […] Our consistent advice from science was that we 
needed to ramp up the testing fast, but the decision to go for 100,000, as 
the Secretary of State has described, was done on the basis of how fast we 
could do it, not that there was a scientifically derived right answer. […] but 
I would not say there was any disagreement between our scientists and the 
more operational side. There was a clear need to ramp it up and setting a 
public target was a very good way of doing so.211
124. However, the Institute for Government (IfG), a think tank, suggested in a report, 
published in August, that the heavy public emphasis on the numerical target rather than 
a focus on an “analysis of the problem it was trying to solve and its policy goals, and then 
setting specific objectives to serve those goals” became a “distraction”.212 Further, the IfG 
report pointed out that while the Government reported that it had met its target—with 
122,000 tests on 30 April—this included 27,000 testing kits sent by mail that day.213 Data 
on the GOV.UK website subsequently confirmed that on 30 April, approximately 83,000 
virus tests were carried out in laboratories, with a total available capacity of over 121,000 
tests.214 The lack of transparency in the reporting of testing data led Sir David Norgrove, 
Chair of the UK Statistics Authority, to write twice to the Secretary of State for Health 
and Social Care citing concerns over “limited detail” and that such data were “widely 
criticised and often mistrusted”.215
125. In early September the Government announced a further goal to scale up testing 
capacity to “500,000 swab tests per day by the end of October”,216 and the advice underlying 
this subsequent goal was also opaque. Speaking to us in September, Baroness Harding, 
head of NHS Test and Trace, explained that the organisation’s testing capacity plans were 
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“based on SAGE modelling”.217 However, Baroness Harding later wrote to us to clarify 
that “SAGE has not provided modelling of testing capacity requirements specifically” but 
that SAGE analysis factored into capacity modelling:
In order to model and forecast potential demand for testing and therefore 
what testing capacity will be required, NHS Test and Trace and the 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) analysts draw on a range 
of sources including outputs from SPI-M modelling of the epidemic and 
modelling of the [Reasonable Worst Case Scenario] RWCS. Other sources 
include inpatient testing, screening for screening for elective/non elective 
admissions to hospital and NHS staff using information and forecasts from 
NHS England.218
Testing capacity growth
126. As described to us by Sir Patrick Vallance in March, testing for the novel coronavirus 
in the early stages of the pandemic was “largely able to be done through Public Health 
England”.219 Covid-19 testing was initially carried out solely within PHE’s London 
laboratories, before being expanded on 7 February to a further eleven PHE and NHS 
laboratories throughout the UK, which was described as the “fastest deployment of a 
novel test” in recent history.220
127. The UK’s initial centralised approach to testing differed from strategies employed 
in other countries, most notably the Republic of Korea. Speaking to us in early April, 
Dr Seon Kui Erica Lee, Director of Risk Assessment and International Cooperation at 
the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, explained that the country had 
“learned a lot of lessons from the [Middle East respiratory syndrome] MERS outbreak in 
2015” and expanded testing capacity “in a very short period of time”:
Currently, there are a total of 118 institutions available for diagnostic tests: the 
Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the national quarantine 
stations, and the Institute of Health and Environment, which are affiliated 
with local government. Private clients, clinical laboratories and hospitals 
are all included in the national laboratory network. […] The expansion of 
the testing capacity was made possible thanks to the active collaborative 
efforts between Government, academia and the private sector.221
128. The focus on decentralised testing strategies was also reflected by World Health 
Organisation guidance published on 21 March:
If testing is available at the national level, plan for surge capacity by 
establishing decentralized testing capacity in sub-national laboratories 
under the supervision of the covid-19 national reference laboratory. 
Options to engage private laboratory services or the academic sector should 
be considered.222
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218 Correspondence from Baroness Dido Harding regarding follow up evidence
219 Sir Patrick Vallance, UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (Q83)
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129. However, Professor Sharon Peacock, Director of the National Infection Service at 
PHE, explained that the UK had adopted a different model, comprising a “centralised, 
high-throughput” capability alongside a “distributed network of tests in the NHS”.223 
While Professor Peacock acknowledged the possibility of such capacity being “exhausted”, 
requiring further expansion, she advocated a centralised approach:
First, we can open up new specific laboratories in universities or other 
hospital settings. Laboratories in this country have largely been merged, so 
we have a smaller number of larger laboratories. The alternative is to have 
a single large testing site. From my perspective, it is more efficient to have 
a bigger testing site than dissipating our efforts into a lot of laboratories 
around the country.224
130. When we questioned whether there had been an analysis underlying the decision to 
take a different course of action to the approach taken in the Republic of Korea, Public 
Health England undertook to share such information “in the next few days”.225 However, 
despite a series of exchanges with Public Health England—226and an apology from the 
then Chief Executive of PHE—no specific analysis for the decision has been forthcoming.227
131. Sir Paul Nurse, Director of the Francis Crick Institute, questioned the sole focus 
on a “mega-lab approach”, explaining that logistical issues would need to be “solved on 
a national scale” requiring time and effort. Speaking to us in April, he suggested that 
at the time it was “a bit late” to adopt this approach, and that a combination of both 
large national laboratories and smaller, localised collaborations were needed.228 This 
collaborative approach was reflected in an April press release, where Sir Paul commented 
publicly that “Institutes like [the Francis Crick] are coming together with a Dunkirk spirit 
– small boats that collectively can have a huge impact on the national endeavour.”229
132. Discussing the issues with testing capacity in May, Professor Yvonne Doyle, Director 
for Health Protection at Public Health England, explained that PHE did “not have capacity 
to do mass testing” and that in contrast with Germany, which had “many hundreds” of 
labs, the UK had a “different laboratory strategy, with mass laboratory testing and mass 
throughput through the NHS”.230 The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care 
echoed this to us in July, stating that PHE was “never set up to be a scale organisation”, 
but conceded that he did not know this in advance of the encountered issues. He also 
indicated that the policy for covid-19 testing “shifted over” to DHSC on 17 March, after 
which time it was “expanded”.231 Mr Hancock also suggested that one lesson learnt was 
the need for a “standing capability” for mass testing.232
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133. This change of course was made clear to us by Professor John Newton, the then UK 
National Testing Strategy Coordinator, who wrote to us in June to outline that an “online 
portal”—launched on 8 April233—was created to accept offers of external support and that 
outreach activities had been undertaken:
To consolidate work with industry and other partners on increasing 
laboratory capacity, Government held two roundtables in March first with 
Universities UK, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 
and DEFRA institutions, and then with a wider group of representatives 
from major research institutes, universities and government departments.234
134. However, several written evidence submissions provided to us from learned societies 
and research institutes pointed out that—early in the pandemic—there were difficulties 
in engaging with the Government to offer testing capacity and support such as scientists, 
equipment and consumables (e.g. swabs and chemicals).235 Further, it appeared there was 
a lack of clarity in what communication channels were available, with written submissions 
detailing failed attempts to contact PHE, DHSC, the Cabinet Office, NHS England and 
local NHS trusts. For example, the Royal Society of Chemistry highlighted this confusion:
a number of people that we spoke with in our community had worked to 
offer their capacity before [guidance was published by Government]. Many 
researchers were contacting multiple agencies, NHS trusts and government 
departments in parallel to offer support with no clear sense as to whether a 
national or local coordination effort was in place.236
The Society pointed to a “sense among researchers” that national structures and guidance 
arrived “too late” and that even when a centralised call to action was in place, many 
researchers “did not hear back for a long time” but that “at the same time, some were 
being contacted directly by local NHS trusts and hospitals asking for specific capabilities, 
suggesting that the centralised system was not delivering quickly enough”.
135. Evidence provided by Steve Bates, CEO of the Bioindustry Association, in early 
April also suggested that there was a lag in coordinating wider industry involvement in 
boosting testing capacity. Mr Bates explained to us that while Government collaborations 
with Thermo Fisher and Randox were “commissioned relatively recently”, specific details 
and plans for testing capacity requirements were only made clear a few days before our 
evidence session.237
136. Professor Doyle explained to us in May that one cause of the delay in coordinating 
external capacity was the initial categorisation238 of the novel coronavirus as a hazard 
group three pathogen:
The reason why every laboratory was not able to engage in this immediately 
[…] was that this was a novel virus. It was treated as a dangerous pathogen 
and was, therefore, categorised as level 3. That meant very few laboratories 
233 GOV.UK, Help the government increase coronavirus (COVID-19) testing capacity, published 8 April 2020
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initially could [carry out testing]. We spotted that and made an application 
to the Committee on Dangerous Pathogens to reduce the level so that more 
laboratories could come on stream, because we knew there was going to be 
a capacity problem. On 1 March, the Health and Safety Executive granted 
that permission, and that then allowed many more laboratories to engage.239
137. The Government was too slow to increase testing capacity to the levels required to 
help contain the spread of the coronavirus. We have previously suggested that strategy 
was driven by the capacity available, rather than strategy driving the necessary increase 
in capacity. It was clear early in the year that Public Health England was not set up 
for the mass scale necessary for coronavirus testing. This lesson had previously been 
learned by countries who dealt with the MERS outbreak of 2015, and it is regrettable 
that it is a lesson that the UK did not heed in advance of the pandemic.
138. The Government was slow to move once it realised that coronavirus testing 
required a rapid expansion and did not engage sufficiently with the wide array of 
scientific expertise available within the UK—particularly within our universities and 
research institutes. While we appreciate the complexities of such a feat, including the 
need to ensure health and safety guidelines are adhered to, it does not justify that 
many researchers who were willing and able to contribute went unheard. An overt 
initial focus on boosting capacity within established structures—namely PHE and 
NHS laboratories—clouded the exploration of a more decentralised avenue, such as 
that clearly employed by the Republic of Korea. As such, a significant and foreseeable 
opportunity was missed to prepare the UK for a potential pandemic situation.
139. The Committee will report separately and more fully on the test, trace and isolate 
system and the mass testing programme in due course. But in considering the role of 
science advice, and its influence on Government decisions, we are concerned by the 
continued lack of justification provided to the Committee by Public Health England 
for taking an initial centralised approach, and why a more decentralised approach—
drawing, for example, on the experience of the Republic of Korea—has not been 
followed.
140. The creation of NHS Test and Trace involves a budget of £22 billion for financial 
year 2020–21 and the justification for most of its spending being on the central part 
of the system, rather than through local public health teams, has not been clearly 
made. Concerns have also been raised about the inability of local public health teams 
to access timely information. This is particularly concerning given SAGE’s conclusion 
in September that the system, at that time, was “having a marginal impact on 
transmission”.
141. The Government should: explain clearly the justification for taking a relatively 
centralised approach to test, trace and isolate; set out its assessment of the impact of 
the system on the spread of the virus since the outset, including on health outcomes; and 
review the balance between the local and national components of the system, including 
its value for money and effectiveness. The Government should set out the rationale 
and justification for, as the National Audit Office put it, the “unusual organisational 
relationship” that NHS Test and Trace has with the Department of Health and Social 
Care.
239 Professor Yvonne Doyle, Director for Health Protection, Public Health England (Q654)
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Social distancing and face coverings
142. Throughout our inquiry we have taken evidence on the impact and justification for 
a wide range of non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as school closures and wider 
lockdown measures. While our enquiries have continued beyond the material covered 
in this Report, most notably as part of our joint inquiry with the Health and Social Care 
Committee into coronavirus: lessons learnt,240 we discuss two specific measures in this 
section: face coverings and the two-metre rule.
The two-metre rule
143. Social distancing guidance published by the Government on 23 March recommended 
that individuals keep a two-metre distance from anyone outside of their household, to 
reduce risk of transmission of the novel coronavirus.241 One SAGE paper considered on 
12 March analysed the evidence available at the time and concluded that “1 metre is a 
minimum, 2 metres is precautionary”, further stating that a contact duration of over 
15 minutes was “pragmatic and possibly conservative”.242 Nevertheless, many different 
countries adopted differing recommendations on social distancing, with the World Health 
Organisation recommending a distance of “at least 1 meter” from those with symptoms as 
early as January.243
144. Speaking to us in May, Professor Yvonne Doyle indicated that the UK had looked at “a 
range of international evidence” and taken a “precautionary approach and said 2 metres, 
full stop”, although she acknowledged that there was a “balance”: “On one side, we are 
aware of the requirements of the economy and business; on the other side, we are aware of 
the concerns and anxieties of the population”.244 In the same evidence session, Professor 
Catherine Noakes, Professor of Environmental Engineering for Buildings at University 
of Leeds and a SAGE participant, pointed out that the science underlying the 2-metre 
rule was “very complex” and could be adjusted, but concluded that the recommendation 
was based on “where the evidence is sitting at the moment”.245 Nevertheless, she also 
highlighted that in countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, where social distancing 
of 1 metre was recommended, mask wearing was mandatory which “probably reduces 
the distance that [droplets] can be projected”, although she suggested this was a “policy 
decision”.246
145. We subsequently wrote to the Prime Minister on 29 May requesting a review of the 
two-metre rule, following guidance considered by SAGE from 28 April that acknowledged 
that it was “possible to put control measures in place to enable distancing at less than 
2m”.247 A review was subsequently carried out and published in late June, concluding that 
240 More information on Science and Technology Committee and Health and Social Care Committee joint inquiry 
into Coronavirus: lessons learnt may be found at: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/657/coronavirus-
lessons-learnt/
241 UK Government, Staying at home and away from others (social distancing), 23 March 2020, accessed 27 
November 2020
242 NERVTAG, Paper for SAGE—distance, time, handshakes, 12 March 2020
243 World Health Organisation, Advice on the use of masks in the community, during home care and in health care 
settings in the context of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak, 29 January 2020
244 Professor Yvonne Doyle, Director for Health Protection, Public Health England (Qq695–698)
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2020
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“guidance should change to state that 2m or 1m with risk mitigation (where 2m is not 
viable) are acceptable”.248 This proved essential for hospitality venues being able to open 
up, as reflected by comments by Dame Carolyn Fairbairn, CBI Director-General, on 23 
June that “easing social distancing rules will make a material difference to the viability of 
thousands of firms.249
Face coverings
146. Although World Health Organisation guidance from January concluded that “no 
evidence is available on [masks’] usefulness to protect non-sick persons”—a message which 
was reinforced in April—later guidance issued in June changed and recommended that 
“governments should encourage the general public to wear masks in specific situations”.250 
UK Government guidance in England on the use of face coverings began with masks 
becoming mandatory on public transport from 15 June; in shops and supermarkets from 
24 July; and in further indoor settings from 8 August.251
147. When we asked Sir Patrick Vallance in July on whether the UK had deviated from 
WHO guidance on social distancing rules and the use of face coverings, he suggested that 
was not the case:
If you go back, our advice on face masks was in April. We said that face 
masks are of marginal positive value when used in enclosed spaces where 
crowding may occur and you cannot keep 2 metres’ distance. That is, 
essentially, the advice that WHO have come out with and is, essentially, 
the advice that now forms the basis of policy […] We were rather ahead of 
[WHO] in terms of that particular piece of advice.252
Sir Patrick cautioned that there was a “danger of confusing operational accountability 
with scientific advice”, but pointed out that SAGE was not the only source of science 
advice and that there was “a whole system of public health and other things that make 
decisions based on science”. Providing an example of further considerations, he suggested 
there was a “real concern” that the supply of medical-grade masks would be affected if face 
coverings were made mandatory in April.253
148. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care outlined his view to us in July that 
the change of policy on face coverings was a “classic example” of responding to a change in 
scientific evidence, for which he made “no apologies”.254 However, written evidence from 
the Royal Society suggested that a precautionary approach was not immediately applied 
to the use of face coverings in the UK:
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even in the absence of [randomised controlled trial] RCT evidence, it was 
[the] understanding of modes of transmission and the need for precautionary 
common sense that convinced over 50 governments, including the UK, 
to make the use of face masks mandatory in situations where physical 
distancing is not possible or predictable such as busy public transport, 
shopping and other potentially crowded public or workspaces.255
149. Throughout the pandemic, the UK has relied on its own bespoke system of science 
advice and guidance on non-pharmaceutical interventions, while at the same time 
global-level guidance has been issued regularly by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO). There have also been numerous opportunities to learn from the approaches 
undertaken by nations around the world. The UK’s policies on areas such as testing and 
tracing, the two-metre rule and the use of face coverings suggest that the Government’s 
approach has been to carve its own path between SAGE and WHO advice. We have 
heard that a “precautionary” approach was taken to social distancing in the UK—
based on SAGE guidance—above the World Health Organisation’s recommendation 
of “at least 1 metre”. However, on face coverings a precautionary approach was not 
employed, and SAGE’s recommendations were not taken up until two months after 
they were made. In general, more lessons could have been applied from the experiences 
of other countries, particularly those which have dealt with previous coronavirus 
outbreaks (e.g. SARS and MERS). The Government should commit to review—before 
the end of 2021—the relationship between SAGE and expert advisory structures in other 
countries and the World Health Organisation, to understand where knowledge sharing 
may be improved during future emergencies.
150. Given the importance of refining interventions to mitigate both impacts on public 
health and economic recovery, a review of social distancing measures came quite 
late. While the scientific approach quite rightly waits for the evidence before making 
a definitive recommendation, this often necessitates delay and may not produce 
conclusive results. The pandemic has demanded that policy be made and adapted 
on a faster timescale and in this instance the Government was too slow to respond. 
The Government should employ a more adaptive approach to non–pharmaceutical 
interventions such as social distancing rules and commit to a review of the approach 
employed in the UK as compared with countries that dealt with the SARS and MERS 
outbreaks (such as the Republic of Korea), setting out the reasoning for differences in 
policy decisions. The outcome of this review should be published by the end of 2021.
Vaccine and therapeutic development
151. The May covid-19 recovery strategy reflected the UK Government’s emphasis on 
a research-led exit from the pandemic, stating that it was “clear that the only feasible 
long-term solution lies with a vaccine or drug-based treatment”.256 While research and 
development efforts into vaccines and treatments for covid-19 have much yet to discover, 
significant progress has been made.257 This section will briefly explore the initial science 
advice around Government support for research efforts into vaccines and therapeutics.
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152. As early as 18 February, SAGE discussed that it was “essential that the UK plans for 
how it will handle clinical trials and treatment should there be an outbreak of covid-19 
in the UK”.258 Subsequently on 16 March, DHSC mandated that the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR) “prioritise nationally-sponsored covid-19 research activity”, 
including the temporary pausing of non–covid-19 clinical research, unless doing so would 
“have significant detrimental effects on the ongoing care of individual participants”.259 
This suspension continued until 21 May when the NIHR released a ‘Framework for 
restart’ of research not relating to covid-19.260 Other measures were announced in 
March by the Health Research Authority and the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency—the UK’s regulators of clinical research—to “fast track” ethical 
reviews and provide “rapid scientific advice, reviews and approvals” in a similar fashion 
to during the 2014 Ebola epidemic when clinical trials were authorised “within a week”.261 
Nevertheless, Professor Andrew Pollard, Professor of Paediatric Infection and Immunity 
at the University of Oxford, explained to us in March that while “regulatory reviews that 
may take months are being done in days”, it was not due to “shortcuts” being used but 
rather that the regulatory bodies were “putting more people on it”.262
153. Speaking to us in July, Deputy Chief Medical Officer Professor Jonathan Van-Tam 
suggested that the rapid pace of research developments was in part due to lessons learned 
from a “reflection exercise” following the 2009 swine flu pandemic:
we had to get an awful lot of research going very fast, from a blank sheet 
of paper. After that [exercise], the mentality changed. There is a long list of 
studies on pandemic influenza that were prepared, rehearsed, funded and 
then mothballed, ready for an influenza pandemic. […] First of all, it was 
getting research moving much, much faster, and indeed repurposing some 
of the studies that had been prepared for pandemic flu to mobilise them for 
a new purpose to the coronavirus pandemic.263
Giving an example of the speed of establishing research in the UK, Professor Van-Tam 
pointed out that the set-up of the large-scale RECOVERY trial took place over a “matter 
of a couple of weeks from concept through to the first patient being recruited”.264
154. Reflecting the drive towards recruitment to covid-19 clinical trials, SAGE guidance 
from 26 March cautioned that it was “vital not to make hasty decisions regarding 
treatments based on poor data. All cases should be used in some form of clinical trial”.265 
In April, the four Chief Medical Officers (CMOs) of the UK and the National Medical 
Director for NHS England wrote to all NHS trusts to ask that “every effort is made” to 
enrol patients in three nationwide phase III clinical trials: PRINCIPLE; RECOVERY; and 
REMAP–CAP.266 Further, the letter cautioned against the use of off-licence medicines 
outside of clinical trials settings:
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we strongly discourage the use of off-licence treatments outside of a trial, 
where participation in a trial is possible. Use of treatments outside of a 
trial, where participation was possible, is a wasted opportunity to create 
information that will benefit others.
A subsequent letter was issued on 6 May, emphasising that as covid-19 hospital admissions 
decreased it would “become even more important that a high proportion of patients with 
covid-19 are enrolled onto trials”.267 Associate Professor Ed Juszczak, Director of the 
National Perinatal Epidemiology Unit Clinical Trials Unit at the University of Oxford has 
suggested that the encouragement of the CMOs had been “fundamental” to the success of 
the RECOVERY trial and the speed of its growth.268
155. Efforts were also made to coordinate research and development (R&D) efforts 
around vaccines and treatments within the heart of the Government. On 17 April, the 
Government announced the launch of a Vaccine Taskforce to “drive forward, expedite 
and co-ordinate efforts to research and then produce a coronavirus vaccine.”269 Similarly, 
a Therapeutics Taskforce was established in early April “to ensure that promising therapies 
are tested as fast as possible and that patients in the UK get access to effective medicines 
as soon as possible.”270 A SAGE report from 6 April (published 19 June) suggested that 
before the Vaccine Taskforce was set up, work across Government was “not sufficiently 
coordinated”.271 Kate Bingham, the then Chair of the Vaccine Taskforce, explained to us 
in July how the group linked together vaccine expertise from across the public and private 
sectors:
We have worked quite quickly. […] We have assembled a private sector 
expert team that we have embedded within Government. In addition, we 
have seconded people from NIHR, which is the national institute in the UK 
that runs clinical studies, and MHRA, which is the regulator that decides 
whether or not vaccines and drugs are safe and effective. That means we are 
getting realtime top advice.272
156. Beyond research efforts, it was also clear from the outset that significant expense 
would be required at risk of failure. Professor Andrew Pollard, of the University of 
Oxford, explained to us in our first evidence session in March that this was “one of the 
real challenges that makes this very different from normal vaccine development”:
you would not normally invest at risk in upscaling manufacturing at this 
very early stage, before we even have any data in humans. If you wait for all 
the trials to complete before you do that, we are years and years away.273
Professor Pollard further suggested that while manufacturing processes were “fairly 
standard”, the challenge was to free up “more capacity to get there quicker, rather than 
cutting corners.”274
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157. When we subsequently wrote to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to 
raise these points,275 we heard that the development and distribution of a covid-19 vaccine 
was a “top priority” for the Government and that the purpose of the Vaccine Taskforce 
was to “make sure all parts of the pursuit for a vaccine are as efficient as possible”.276 We 
also received later updates from the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy on further Government investment into vaccine manufacturing and supply.277 The 
effort within the UK towards the development of vaccines, and securing of their supply, 
has resulted in the UK having access to one of the highest potential number of doses per 
head—including the vaccine candidate developed by the University of Oxford—278 and 
being the first country to approve the use of a leading vaccine.279
158. The development of vaccines and therapeutics is a policy area in which it is right 
that science must lead the way, so that there may be a high level of confidence that a 
rigorous approach has been taken towards safety and efficacy. From the beginning 
of the pandemic, the clear advice from experts was that significant investment and 
resource, at risk of failure, was required on many fronts to maximise the potential for 
success. The Government listened to this advice and we applaud the speed at which the 
Government implemented support for research and clinical trials, and took steps to 
secure the manufacture and procurement of potential vaccines.
159. We acknowledge that a large part of the success to date into the development of 
covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics can be credited to lessons learned from previous 
outbreaks and efforts made to prepare for future crises. As further promising vaccine 
candidates and treatments come to light, other aspects of the Government’s pandemic 
preparedness, such as the logistics of a mass vaccination campaign, will be tested.
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Annex One: Letter from the Chair of the 
Committee to the Prime Minister, dated 
18 May 2020
Dear Prime Minister,
COVID-19 pandemic: some lessons learned so far
I am writing to you on behalf of the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee. We are delighted to see you back after your recovery from Coronavirus and 
send our warm congratulations to you and Carrie on the birth of your son.
My Committee has been taking evidence relating to the COVID-19 pandemic as part of 
our inquiry, UK Science, Research and Technology Capability and Influence in Global 
Disease Outbreaks.280 It is important for us to ask questions during the pandemic both:
i) to ensure that contemporary evidence is captured on decisions and 
assessments so that not all evidence relies on recollections and hindsight; 
and
ii) so that any lessons learned which are relevant to the ongoing management 
of the pandemic can be uncovered and applied.
With the second purpose in mind, we wanted to share with you, your Ministers and 
advisers some findings that we have identified through our first six public evidence 
sessions that have implications for the ongoing response to the pandemic.
It is important to say from the outset that any live response to this new and deadly virus—
which was unknown to most of the world at the beginning of this year, and which has 
spread explosively to almost every country on Earth, and whose medical and scientific 
characteristics are being revealed and analysed day-by-day—to entail decisions, made in 
good faith and with the best information then available—which turn out to be wrong as 
well as right. Judgements, necessarily made within a fog of uncertainty, will be revealed 
by subsequent experience some to have been correct, and some incorrect. Scientific 
hypotheses that were advanced on good grounds when tested by the emerging evidence 
will be found in some cases to gain in force, and in others to need to be revised or retired.
We seek to be purposeful: in the true spirit of science to confront theory and early practice 
with the evidence that experience makes available, and so to be able to learn and apply the 
lessons at the earliest possible opportunity.
A policy and practice that is open to learning from experience and making necessary 
adjustments is more deserving of public confidence than one which is impervious to 
criticism or resistant to alteration.
On this basis, we offer ten findings and recommendations so far.
280 https://committees.parliament.uk/work/91/uk-science-research-and-technology-capability-and-influence-in-
global-disease-outbreaks/
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SCIENTIFIC ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT
Finding 1: The Government has sought to obtain and act on good scientific advice
The United Kingdom benefits from one of the strongest bases of scientific expertise in the 
world—in terms of both individuals and institutions.
The conception and structure of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) 
and its sub-groups is designed to capitalise on this strength—drawing on a range of 
specialists whose expertise is most relevant to the nature of the emergency in question.
It is clear from all of our evidence sessions that SAGE and its subsidiary groups have 
been extensively consulted and highly influential in Government decisions throughout 
the pandemic.
The leading scientists in SAGE, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), Sir 
Patrick Vallance, and the Chief Medical Officer for England (CMO), Professor Chris 
Whitty, are substantial figures with independent reputations. SAGE has met frequently 
throughout the crisis and, and according to its website, 26 times from late January to mid-
April.281
Several witnesses who have participated in SAGE meetings described how the Group has 
made a serious attempt to distil the range of scientific views into advice to Government.
Professor Neil Ferguson, for example, told us:
The Government have, I believe, been informed by the scientific evidence 
and have balanced that against other considerations—economic, health 
and all the things one might expect them to do.282
Professor Chris Whitty explained the different groups feeding into SAGE:
You have to remember that underneath the SAGE structure sit multiple 
other professional scientific advisory groups, and underneath that is a 
whole body of fantastic academic work.283
Witnesses told the Committee that the distinction between distilling up-to-date scientific 
knowledge—including areas of differing opinion—relevant to policy decisions and 
directing those decisions was well understood by those who have participated in SAGE 
meetings.
Sir Patrick Vallance, for example, told us that he thought:
the Government have listened to the advice of SAGE very carefully and 
followed it. Clearly, there are decisions that need to be made by politicians 
on how they want to implement that advice, and those areas are, rightly, 
political decisions and not scientific ones.284
281 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/883086/
sage-meeting-papers.csv
282 Q9 (all question numbers in footnotes refer to oral evidence taken before the Committee–transcripts are 




61 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 
Further when we asked Sir Patrick in March if there had been any “significant disagreement 
between the Government and their scientific advisers on anything material”, he was 
unambiguous in his response, simply replying “no”.285
Professor Chris Whitty told us how SAGE sought to distil the scientific evidence and its 
associated uncertainties—which may lead to a difference of opinion among those who 
have participated in SAGE meetings—in a helpful way for the Government to aid decision 
making:
It is not very useful to Ministers or other decision makers to say, “There are 
16 opinions. Here are all 16. Make up your mind.” Part of the process is to 
say in a unified way, “Here is the central view”, and then, if there are either 
dissenting views or a range of uncertainty quantitatively around that, to 
convey it in a way that is comprehensible to the people who are listening so 
that they understand the certainty with which the advice is being proffered. 
If they do not, it is clearly going to lead to bad decision making.286
The Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) similarly explained:
I think what SAGE has to do is to try to take complex science and bring 
it to a position where we say, “This is the consensus view of where we are 
now, but we are clear about the function and purposes of argument.” What 
I think is not helpful is to say, “Here are several different views,” and ask 
somebody who is less knowledgeable to bring these together and come to a 
single view. In SAGE, we try to come up with a consensus view, but we are 
always clear and open about how we arrive at that.287
While there is, and must continue to be, a clear distinction between the role of scientists as 
advisers, and Ministers as decision-takers, it is clear that the Government has been serious 
in taking scientific advice, and that British scientists on SAGE have sought to give that 
advice in a way designed to help decision making.
Recommendation 1: The Government should continue to draw on extensive scientific 
advice through the further stages of the pandemic.
Finding 2: The transparency around scientific advice has not always been as clear as it 
should have been.
The strength of British science and the prominent role that scientific advice has played 
during the pandemic can be an important source of public confidence. The regular 
appearances of the GCSA and CMO at Downing Street press conferences have been a 
public demonstration that scientific advice has been influential in Government decisions.
Yet there have been a number of concerns over the transparency of the scientific advice 
given and its relationship to Government decisions.
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There are a number of reasons why transparency over who attends SAGE is beneficial.
It is likely to a be a source of strength to demonstrate the breadth and depth of scientific 
advice that is being drawn on by Ministers and officials; and it also allows scrutiny of 
whether SAGE contains the appropriate range of disciplines necessary to give rounded 
advice.
Following evidence sessions held by the Committee, Sir Patrick Vallance made a 
commitment to publish the membership of SAGE. The Committee is grateful for that 
response to its concerns and strongly welcomes the decision.
All but two of the names of people who have attended SAGE were published on 4 May. 
However, the published list conflates those who are part of a core membership that has 
guided policy throughout the pandemic while others—as Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter 
told us—had been present for a single meeting.
A second concern is over the timely publication of the scientific papers on which SAGE 
has drawn for its advice. A website was established within gov.uk (“Scientific advice 
supporting the government response to COVID-19”) containing relevant papers.288 A 
commitment was given to the Committee in a letter on 4 April from Sir Patrick Vallance 
“to regularly publish evidence documents and studies on gov.uk which have formed the 
basis of SAGE’s discussions and advice”.289
However, after March no further papers were uploaded to the website until—after the 
Committee raised the matter with the CMO at our hearing on 24 April—a further set of 
papers were published on 5 May.
While it is welcome that some papers used to inform SAGE meetings have been published 
on this website, to date the majority of papers (92 out of 120) have not been published 
according to the full list of meeting papers published on gov.uk, meaning much of the 
evidence informing SAGE is still not in the public domain.290
The CMO explained in evidence on 24 April that in certain emergencies, questions of 
protecting intelligence and national security arise:
The last time there was a SAGE thing was the Novichok poisonings in 
Salisbury; at that point I was interim chief Government scientific adviser 
and I chaired it. There was absolutely no way we were going to put those 
documents into the public domain, nor will we. I have also been involved 
previously in SAGE meetings where some of the information was at a 
classified level and some was not. There will be a mixture.291
That is completely understood and accepted by the Committee. However the CMO 








63 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 
SAGE on this occasion is dealing with something that is a straight science-
to-policy question […] wherever possible, we absolutely should be putting 
out the data and trying to give the underlying workings.292
Our third observation concerns the transparency of SAGE’s advice itself. The Government 
has drawn attention to basing its decisions on scientific advice, while accepting that policy 
decisions are made by Ministers rather than scientific advisers. Individuals who have 
participated in SAGE meetings during the current pandemic have confirmed that. For 
example, Professor Neil Ferguson said: “To be clear, SAGE does not recommend policy”.293
It is clearly important that this distinction is respected. However, there is no transparency 
over what the advice of SAGE is—whether in the form of its actual advice to Ministers, 
minutes of its meetings, or even a summary, suitable for publication, of its advice.
Without visibility of the scientific advice it will be difficult to corroborate the Government’s 
assertion that it always follows the scientific advice.
In particular, there will be a margin of ambiguity about what was the scientific advice and 
what was a matter of policy. To avoid the risk of elision between the scientific advice and 
policy decisions, it would be good practice to ensure these are always distinguishable.
Recommendation 2: To increase transparency in the provision of scientific advice the 
Government should:
iii) update regularly the now public list of members of SAGE and state how 
many meetings the named people attended;
iv) disclose the disciplines of SAGE participants who are not publicly named;
v) publish promptly the papers on which SAGE draws for its advice after 
each relevant meeting; and
vi) publish now and regularly a summary of the scientific advice which has 
informed Government decisions.
CO-ORDINATION IN SCIENTIFIC ADVICE BETWEEN THE UK NATIONS
Finding 3: The provision of scientific advice has been well co-ordinated between all 
four nations of the United Kingdom.
The Chief Medical Officers for the four nations of the United Kingdom all told us of the 
strong co-operation and regular liaison between the public health organisations of the 
UK.
Dr Gregor Smith, interim Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, for example, told us that 
there has “been regular discussions between the four UK CMOs”, with them speaking to:
one another at a minimum three times a week, but we take various 
opportunities to ensure that we link with one another through senior 
clinician groups or through more ad hoc meetings because things have 
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Further, Dr Smith explained the joint approach that the four nations had been taking: 
“In any of the discussions across the four nations between the CMOs, there has been a 
remarkable sense of agreement on the approaches we need to take from the scientific 
base”.295
The CMO for England made similar points to the Committee:
The interaction among the CMOs has been excellent throughout, and we 
often communicate several times a day if things are urgent. We also all 
interact with our own chief scientific advisers to Government. I operate 
incredibly closely with Sir Patrick Vallance and talk to him or communicate 
with him at least once a day, often more frequently, as things go along.296
Dr Smith told the Committee that although there could be circumstances in which the 
appropriate measures for managing COVID-19 could be different in some parts of the 
UK, there was value to consistent messaging for ensuring public understanding and 
compliance.297
Two potential future reasons for divergent measures advanced were that:
vii) there could be in future different local stages of development in the epidemic; 
and
viii) different operational capabilities of the NHS and public health authorities 
in different parts of the United Kingdom.298
Professor Whitty explained that the recent peak in infections was an “artificial” peak 
brought about through social distancing measures, and that because those measures were 
introduced across the UK at “almost exactly the same time” the peak was “occurring at 
broadly the same time around the country”. Consequently, Professor Whitty advised that 
“the argument for strong regional variation in what we do is not terribly convincing”.299 
All four Chief Medical Officers of the UK indicated their support for this position.300
Recommendation 3: All four UK Chief Medical Officers should continue to work 
closely together on their responses to COVID-19.
TESTING, TRACING AND ISOLATION
Finding 4: Testing capacity has been inadequate for most of the pandemic so far. 
Capacity was not increased early enough or boldly enough. Capacity drove strategy, 
rather than strategy driving capacity.
One of the most significant problems of the handling of the pandemic to date in the 
United Kingdom has been the lack of capacity to test people to determine whether they 
have COVID-19. Very low numbers of people were being tested well into March, with the 
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The Committee has found a consensus embracing a broad range of experts from within 
the UK and overseas—including among the Government’s scientific advisers—that testing 
capacity has been too low.
Sir Patrick Vallance told the Committee on 25 March that he wished the UK had “more 
tests available today”, and that “it would be great to have got ahead of this more than we 
have been able to”.302
Professor Chris Whitty stated on 24 April that SAGE had consistently said that “one of the 
things we need is a greater capacity to test [for COVID-19] across the whole of the UK.303
As far back as February, the WHO-China Joint Report said that countries should 
“immediately expand surveillance to detect COVID-19 transmission chains by […] 
adding testing for the COVID-19 virus to existing surveillance systems”.304
The Committee heard from witnesses from the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and 
Germany who all emphasised the foundational nature of establishing mass testing capacity 
from an early stage.
It was therefore identifiable from the beginning of the pandemic that testing capacity 
would be crucial.
The evidence from Professor Sharon Peacock of Public Health England (PHE) to the 
Committee on 25 March was that PHE had chosen to follow a different approach to 
countries like the Republic of Korea which had engaged in mass testing from an early 
stage. Professor Peacock undertook to share “in the next few days” with the Committee 
the evidence and analysis on which the decision to reject the South Korean approach was 
taken.305
Despite several requests by letter, email and telephone since the 25 March, PHE has 
not produced to the Committee the basis for the pivotal decision to choose an initially 
centralised, smaller scale approach to testing over other leading international approaches.
In a letter of 1 May (for which the Chief Executive of PHE has subsequently apologised306) 
PHE sought to discharge their obligation to share the evidence on which their decision 
was based at the time by pointing to a completely different study only now being carried 
out by the Royal Society on how testing is carried out by other countries.307
The Committee, through the Chair, questioned the Secretary of State in the Chamber 
of the House of Commons on 26 February308 and 11 March309 on what steps were being 
taken to expand capacity, and in correspondence of 30 March and 14 April.310 Answers 
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In evidence to the Committee, Sir Paul Nurse, Director of the Crick Institute, said that he 
had offered his laboratories and staff to the testing effort but he did “not think that [he] got 
a reply” until weeks later, once the Crick Institute had publicly announced its provision of 
testing for healthcare workers.311
The decision to pursue an approach of initially concentrating testing in a limited number 
of laboratories and to expand them gradually, rather than an approach of surging capacity 
through a large number of available public sector, research institute, university and private 
sector labs is one of the most consequential made during this crisis. From it followed the 
decision on 12 March to cease testing in the community and retreat to testing principally 
within hospitals.
Amongst other consequences, it meant that residents in care homes—even those displaying 
COVID-19 symptoms—and care home workers could not be tested at a time when the 
spread of the virus was at its most rampant.
The failure of PHE to publish the evidence on which its testing policy was based is 
unacceptable for a decision that may have had such significant consequences. The 
absence of disclosure may indicate that—notwithstanding the oral evidence given to 
the Committee—no rigorous assessment was in fact made by PHE of other countries’ 
approach to testing. That would be of profound concern since the necessity to consider the 
approaches taken by others with experience of pandemics is obvious.
It is vital that the formal assessment made at the time is published without further 
delay, or, if it does not exist, PHE is open about this and explains why.
Several witnesses who have participated in SAGE meetings told us that the capacity 
to test was an operational matter under the control of PHE, rather than one that they 
could determine. For example, Professor Neil Ferguson told us that testing had “always 
been discussed significantly” at SAGE, but that “the reason it was not included in initial 
modelling was about the projections by PHE of how quickly this country could ramp up 
testing capacity”.312
On 2 April the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Matt Hancock MP, announced 
a target of 100,000 tests a day to be carried out by the end of that month. However, Professor 
Whitty made clear to the Committee that “SAGE did not give that specific target”.313 Even 
public officials emphasised that the 100,000 target was the Secretary of State’s choice, with 
Professor John Newton explaining:
I think specifically, no, it is not a SAGE target; it is the Secretary of State’s 
target. I think he has taken advice from the programme and from colleagues 
[…] I am afraid you would have to ask the Secretary of State himself exactly 
where he got his advice from.314
While there was some public debate at the time about whether the target was met by 30 
April, it is clear that it drove a major expansion of testing to a level, in capacity at least, 
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For such an important determinant of a wide range of policy responses, it is surprising 
that a target designed to galvanise a tenfold increase in testing capacity appears not to 
be on the advice of PHE, NHS England or SAGE but was more of a personal initiative by 
the Secretary of State. Had the public bodies responsible in this space themselves taken 
the initiative at the beginning of February, or even the beginning of March, rather than 
waiting until the Secretary of State imposed a target on 2 April, knowledge of the spread 
of the pandemic and decisions about the response to it may have made more options 
available to decision makers at earlier stages.
Recommendation 4: The Government should publish the assessment of other countries’ 
testing models on which the decision to follow a centralised, sequential approach was 
based.
Finding 5: It is not clear that the lessons of the delays to testing have been learned.
Although multiple witnesses told the Committee that it would have been desirable had 
much greater testing capacity been available from an earlier stage in the pandemic, no 
one gave an account that the lessons had been understood and would be applied to other 
decisions during the future course of the pandemic which were relevant.
Apart from the clinical purpose of identifying for isolation and medical attention of 
those infected with COVID-19, the retreat to testing only hospital patients for the virus 
drastically curtailed the ability to gather data that could have identified the spread of the 
virus among different groups and with different symptomatic severity.
The Office for National Statistics is now conducting a very important sampling exercise 
in which data on the prevalence of COVID-19 in the UK population will be gathered 
and reported twice-weekly. It is of great importance in providing data on the spread of 
diseases, its impact on the different demographic groups and geographies, the incidence 
of asymptomatic transmission and even the Reproduction or ‘R’ number which the 
Government has made key to easing some social distancing restrictions. In evidence to 
the Committee, the National Statistician, Sir Ian Diamond, gave an impressive account of 
the speed in which his team had been able to organise and implement a significant testing 
programme.
Sir Ian said:
The fact that we came into it on a Thursday and, with the University of 
Oxford, put together the design and protocol […] and put it to medical 
ethics the following Monday and data ethics on Tuesday, with letters out to 
potential participants on the Wednesday, seems to me to be one of the most 
rapid surveys I have ever in my life seen go into the field.315
However, Sir Ian also told the Committee that the request to put together such a testing 
programme was made only on 17 April.
It is not clear why such a study could not have been instigated by the Government at a 
much earlier stage. Indeed, had this study been in operation even a month earlier, many 
of the decisions that will be made on social distancing during the days and weeks ahead 
may have been made earlier, based on much more detailed data. With early estimates of 
315 Q389
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the impact on the economy of the lockdown running at over £17 billion a week,316 there 
seems to be insufficient recognition that an avoidable delay in being able to take decisions 
because of the lack of data has an impact that is vastly greater the cost of the data collection 
exercise. In particular, the intended use by the Government of current estimates of the 
Reproduction number (‘R’) depends, as well as on modelling assumptions that should be 
open to be examined, on the depth and breadth of the data available to estimate it.
Being able to operate at scale at, or in advance of, the point of need is a key lesson from the 
testing experience and will have a particular relevance to vaccination, which we discuss 
in finding 9 below.
Recommendation 5: The Government should learn and apply the lessons from the 
slowness of the provision of testing capacity and take every opportunity to build 
capacity in advance of need to surge capacity explosively rather than follow a more 
gradual “ramping up” approach.
Finding 6: Strategies to deal with carriers of COVID-19 who were asymptomatic have 
not been clear.
One of the consequences of the small capacity for testing has been that the test has until 
recently been largely reserved for people suffering from suspected symptoms of COVID-19.
Yet evidence presented to the Committee has raised the prospect that a high proportion 
of people with COVID-19—and therefore capable of transmitting it to others—are free of 
all symptoms.
Professor Xihong Lin of Harvard University said
In our paper, we analysed that about 60% to 80% of daily new cases were 
asymptomatic. This was very interesting. A New England Journal of 
Medicine article was published earlier this week. In that study, they tested 
pregnant women in New York City. Among 215 pregnant women who 
tested positive, 85% were asymptomatic. Yesterday in the news there was a 
report on Boston homeless shelters: among a couple of hundred people who 
were tested, all those who tested positive were asymptomatic.317
The possibility of significant levels of asymptomatic transmission have a profound 
consequence for the management of the pandemic.
If people have no means of knowing they are infected, then they risk transmitting the 
infection to large numbers of people if they are not rigorously socially distanced. This is 
a particular concern for NHS workers and care workers who may be asymptomatically 
infected and transmitting the disease to vulnerable people with whom they are in close 
contact.
A significant degree of asymptomatic infection may require regular testing in particular 
settings—like hospitals and care homes—of all workers who come into contact with 
vulnerable groups, whether or not they display symptoms themselves.
316 Centre for Economics and Business Research, ‘Estimates of daily economic impact of the UK’s lockdown by 
sector’, published 6 April 2020
317 Q229
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Recommendation 6: The Government should explicitly set out its approach to managing 
the risk of asymptomatic transmission of the disease.
Finding 7: In combination with other measures, contact tracing can help to reduce 
the spread of disease. The UK’s limited capacity for contact tracing was an important 
factor in the decision to stop full contact tracing on 12 March.
Rigorous contact tracing has been used in several countries that have reported low death 
rates from COVID-19, such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. Professor 
Chris Whitty told the Committee that contact tracing was a “very powerful tool of public 
health”, but that it was “unbelievably labour intensive” if done manually.318 Although 
Professor John Newton gave the Committee his opinion that contact tracing would have 
been stopped once there was widespread transmission in the UK regardless of capacity,319 
many of our expert witnesses acknowledged that limited testing and tracing capacity was 
a factor in the decision to stop contact tracing. For example, Professor Neil Ferguson said 
on 25 March:
If we have to transit from the suppression strategy and the lockdown 
strategy to something this country can maintain long term, undoubtedly 
much more widespread testing, contact tracing and other methods will 
have to be deployed. If we are talking about back in January/February/ early 
March, it was very clear from messages from Public Health England that we 
would have nowhere near enough testing capacity to adopt that strategy.320
With respect to easing lockdown restrictions, Professor Jonathan Edmunds, of the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, explained that contact tracing would “play a 
role” in managing the epidemic, but would require some social distancing measures to 
remain in place.321 He made clear that the point at which effective contact tracing would 
become feasible was an “operational decision” and would depend on the capacity for 
tracing and isolation in relation to the numbers of cases.322
We also heard that multiple approaches may be required towards managing the manual 
burden of contact tracing, including the use of new technologies. Professor Christophe 
Fraser told us that the use of digital contact tracing applications would be necessary to 
manage the spread of COVID19 as manual efforts would be “unlikely to be quick enough” 
to inform those who might be infected.323 Nevertheless it is clear from the experiences of 
other countries, such as Singapore,324 that we cannot rely on the use of a contact tracing 
application to fulfil our needs. Indeed, Matthew Gould, the Chief Executive Officer of 
NHSX—which is developing the app—indicated to us that achieving the levels of uptake 
required for this approach to be optimal would be “tough”.325 Therefore it is critical that 
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Recommendation 7: The Government must urgently build up contact tracing capacity 
in order to facilitate further easing of social distancing measures as soon as possible, 
while minimising the risk of a second peak in infections.
Finding 8: The role of isolation in combination with testing and tracing has been 
important in countries which have, so far, tackled the pandemic effectively.
The Committee has taken substantial evidence on how other countries have managed the 
pandemic, including leading experts from around the world.
The consistent message from all of these witnesses was that not only is testing and contact 
tracing foundational to effective management but so is an extensive programme of 
isolating and managing infected persons.
Professor Gabriel Leung of Hong Kong University emphasised the importance of 
quarantine and isolation in testing, tracking and tracing the virus in Hong Kong:
every single infected individual who is confirmed by testing goes into a 
hospital bed. In fact, up until very recently, almost all of them would go into 
a negative pressure single room. All their close contacts who are identified by 
contact tracing are then quarantined in an isolated facility that is separately 
and specially prepared for such a purpose. There is no home quarantining 
for close contacts of confirmed cases.326
Dr Erica Lee of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed that the 
Republic of Korea had been using “isolation and quarantine measures”.327 Dr Lee also 
explained how Korea changed its approach to respond to rising cases so that there were 
categories of quarantine:
If they have severe symptoms and they need the treatment, we transport them 
to either the negative pressure rooms or the tertiary hospitals designated by 
the Government. If the symptoms are mild, we have designated living and 
treatment facilities, so they can stay there in isolation and if they become 
severe, we transport them to the hospitals right away. If they have light 
symptoms or they are asymptomatic cases, we sometimes recommended 
that they stay home in isolation.328
Professor Xihong Lin of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health emphasised the 
important role of quarantine and isolation:
social distancing, testing and contact tracing greatly help in reducing the 
transmission but they are not enough, based on analysis of the Wuhan data 
and other countries. Smart isolation and quarantine, such as the centralised 
quarantine and isolation used in Wuhan, is needed to bend the curve in a 
timely fashion.329
Without developed, extensive and operational testing and tracing capacities targeted 
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has reached a dependable level and cases have fallen to a low enough level, other countries 
have found that dedicated facilities to isolate and treat infected people has been important 
in keeping cases very low. These include designated hospitals and non-clinical facilities 
such as requisitioned hotel accommodation.
While intrusive, and incurring cost, providing dedicated facilities may be worthwhile 
when set against the more hidden but vastly greater cost of maintaining tighter restrictions 
on the rest of the population for longer if infected individuals are less rigorously isolated 
from society.
Recommendation 8: The Government should set out the role of isolation and quarantine 
as part of its test, track and trace strategy, ensuring that it draws on the experiences of 
other countries.
DEVELOPMENT OF VACCINES
Finding 9: The development and deployment of vaccines could be critical to halting the 
COVID-19 pandemic. It is encouraging news that the first human trials of potential 
vaccines are now underway in the UK.
The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care announced on 21 April that human 
trials of a potential vaccine for COVID-19 would start on 23 April.330 This is testament to 
the UK’s expertise in this area and the hard work of the researchers involved and those 
supporting them. Professor Sarah Gilbert, who is part of the Oxford team developing a 
vaccine, has said that she is “very optimistic” of a successful vaccine, which is a particularly 
encouraging assessment.331
We took evidence from Professor Andrew Pollard, of the University of Oxford, and Dr 
Melanie Saville, Director of Vaccine Research and Development at the Coalition for 
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), both of whom made clear the need to start 
the manufacture of potential vaccines before their effectiveness is proven in order for any 
successful vaccine to be available at scale as soon as possible.
Dr Saville stressed the importance of investing in manufacturing capacity at an early 
stage and explained the work that CEPI was undertaking in this regard:
to reach a 12 to 18-month timeframe many activities need to be done in 
parallel and at risk. With manufacturing, you do not usually scale up your 
process until you have clinical data. One of the approaches that CEPI is 
taking in terms of funding is to accelerate the scale-up of manufacturing so 
that it is done even at pre-clinical phases.332
Professor Pollard explained that if investment at risk in manufacture of a COVID-19 
vaccine did not take place until all trials were completed then the UK would be “years and 
years away” from having a vaccine that could be ready for mass use.333
330 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/health-and-social-care-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-
19–21-april-2020
331 See for example: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52394485
332 Q50
333 Q53
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Clearly no vaccine may be used (other than in trials) before its effectiveness and safety is 
assured. However, to wait until all trials are completed in order to build up the capacity to 
manufacture and distribute vaccines could lose valuable time. Therefore, even at the risk 
of redundancy, it is imperative to ensure that the UK has built up sufficient manufacturing 
and distribution capacity to roll-out a vaccine as soon as its effectiveness is proven.
Recommendation 9: The Government should build capacity for vaccine manufacture 
and deployment now in advance of need and so that their mass use can start as soon as 
their safety is proven.
RECORDING ETHNICITY
Finding 10: There are significant unexplained differences in the death rates in the UK 
of Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups compared to the population as a whole.
NHS England publishes a breakdown of COVID-19 deaths by ethnicity,334 which is 
dependent upon such information being recorded in emergency department, in-patient 
or out-patient datasets, and is unavailable for almost 10% of such cases. Further, it does 
not cover those who die outside of an NHS setting, for example in care homes.
Professor Chris Whitty, told us that there was “pretty clear evidence that there is over-
representation, at least in certain areas, of people from BAME backgrounds in the number 
of people who get into severe difficulties” with COVID-19, but that the reason for this was 
not clear.335 Further, an analysis from the Institute for Fiscal Studies identified that “data 
published by NHS England on registered hospital deaths by ethnic group have confirmed 
stark inequalities between ethnic groups”. It explained that:
among the black Caribbean and ‘other’ (which includes the Arab 
population) groups, per-capita hospital deaths are close to three times those 
of the white British majority, and the ‘other black’ group has also recorded 
a disproportionate number of hospital deaths.336
Analysis published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 7 May made similar 
findings: “After adjusting for age […], men and women from all ethnic minority groups 
(except females with Chinese ethnicity) are at greater risk of dying from COVID-19 
compared with those of White ethnicity”.337
Professor Whitty made clear to us on 24 April that the cause for BAME over-representation 
in those people “who get into severe difficulties with this disease” was not known.338 The 
ONS analysis identified some of the reasons for the difference in outcomes, and found “that 
the difference between ethnic groups in COVID-19 mortality is partly a result of socio-
economic disadvantage and other circumstances, but a remaining part of the difference 
has not yet been explained”.339
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Professor Whitty explained that he had requested Public Health England and academic 
input to try and establish why there was this over-representation:
I have asked Public Health England to look seriously at any datasets, because 
it is a major concern. In the National Institute for Health Research, we have 
put out a call for our academic colleagues also to look at it.340
It was also highlighted to us that data on the ethnicity of those dying from COVID-19 was 
not systematically collected. Professor Whitty argued that ethnicity and gender should 
be recorded “much more systematically”341 in a wide variety of data sources to facilitate 
monitoring and research into health impacts related to such characteristics. Dr Frank 
Atherton, Chief Medical Officer for Wales, similarly agreed that “more data is needed”.342
Recommendation 10: The Government should consider how ethnicity data on those 
dying as a result of COVID-19 could be systematically recorded.
The Science and Technology Committee hopes that these initial findings and 
recommendations will be useful as a constructive contribution to the important and 
difficult decisions you and your colleagues in Government have to make during the weeks 
ahead.
As we continue to take evidence during the remaining course of this pandemic the 
Committee will, in the same spirit, write to you with further observations based on what 
we learn.
I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the Chief 
Medical Officer for England and the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. I will be placing 
this letter in the public domain.
With best wishes,
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Conclusions and recommendations
Expert advice and Government decision-making structures
1. The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency 
advisory and decision-making structures in living memory. As such, it is important 
that lessons are drawn throughout and applied so that the Government and future 
Governments may be better placed to respond to future crises. This has been the 
purpose of our inquiry—to capture those early lessons in the course of the pandemic. 
The machinery of science advice and decision-making has evolved throughout the 
Government’s management of the covid-19 pandemic, however there is an open 
question regarding the long-term sustainable and efficient provision of science 
advice to Government. Further, it remains unclear—in the long term—what role 
the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) will play, and—as alluded 
to by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser—how organisations such as the 
Joint Biosecurity Centre will provide a solution to the provision of science advice 
to Government in the coronavirus pandemic and beyond. We are concerned that at 
the present time the operation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre and the advice that it 
gives is not fully transparent. The Government, whatever organisational structures 
it decides upon, should commit to publishing the scientific advice it receives unless 
there are matters of national security (see paragraphs 59 to 64). The Government 
should outline in response to this Report how it intends for science advice on the 
novel coronavirus to operate in the longer-term management of the pandemic and 
what roles will be played by new bodies including the National Institute for Health 
Protection and the Joint Biosecurity Centre, alongside SAGE. (Paragraph 33)
2. The Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science should update SAGE guidance 
to set out the role that SAGE will play in advising the Government’s long-term 
management of emergency scenarios. (Paragraph 34)
Activation and operation of SAGE
3. We are satisfied that the SAGE mechanism responded to the advent of the novel 
coronavirus in a timely manner and that the most up-to-date scientific research and 
understanding was readily available to inform the Government from the outset. 
Nevertheless, we note that submissions presented to us raised concerns that during 
the early weeks of the pandemic, policy decisions in response to scientific evidence 
were taken more slowly than was needed, given the rapidity of the spread of the 
virus. (Paragraph 43)
4. It is disappointing that the details of SAGE’s preliminary meetings were not made 
public for over two months, leading to unnecessary concern and confusion over 
what advice the Government had been receiving. Indeed, were it not for our early 
enquiries, this confusion may have continued until the details of SAGE’s initial 
meetings were published at the end of May. We note that SAGE has yet to publish any 
papers that might have been considered in its first two meetings. The Government 
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Office for Science should confirm, as soon as possible, whether any papers were 
considered at the first two SAGE meetings and, if so, it should place them in the public 
domain. (Paragraph 44)
5. We believe the initial response in setting up SAGE was timely. We have heard from 
some sectors of the science community that the community was not consulted 
appropriately. The Government should set out in response to this Report how in 
future emergencies it will engage formally and informally with the community. 
(Paragraph 45)
6. SAGE has been activated for the longest continual period since its inception, which 
brings to question how sustainably the group can maintain its current level of high 
activity. We acknowledge senior scientists’ comments of frequent working round 
the clock, and we pay tribute to their continued service to the public throughout 
this emergency. It is also important to be clear that it is not just the participants of 
SAGE, and its sub-groups, who are managing this workload—it is shared by the 
colleagues, junior researchers and technicians who support them, too, as well as 
Government officials, among others. The Cabinet Office and the Government Office 
for Science should commit to update SAGE guidance to consider what support might 
be required for independent advisers in long-term emergency scenarios, within six 
months of SAGE being deactivated. The Government should identify a way to formally 
recognise and celebrate all those who have contributed to the UK scientific response to 
the pandemic. (Paragraph 51)
Transparency and communication
7. Whilst we welcome the eventual disclosure of SAGE participants, the fact that 
the delay was attributed to advice from the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) gives us cause for concern. As suggested by Professor Chris 
Whitty, the advice relates to emergencies relevant to national security rather than 
public health crises. We therefore conclude that it was not necessary for CPNI advice 
to have resulted in a delay in the public disclosure of SAGE participants of over 
three months. Within three months of this Report, the Cabinet Office should update 
SAGE guidance to stipulate the timeframes in which SAGE should receive advice from 
the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, and other relevant bodies, 
regarding the public disclosure of expert SAGE participants. (Paragraph 56)
8. Regarding the disclosure of Government officials observing SAGE meetings, 
we agree with the redaction of information to protect the personal data of 
individuals including junior officials at the time of the emergency. In the interests 
of transparency, and to have a full picture of who is formulating policy advice to 
Government during the course of the pandemic, it is important that the identities 
of senior officials and political advisers attending SAGE meetings are made public. 
We also note that the minutes of previous SAGEs activated for other emergencies 
were eventually published with full disclosure of all participants and observers. In 
response to this Report, the Government should commit to the full disclosure of the 
following information on SAGE attendees and observers throughout the pandemic:
(1) Civil servants at Senior Civil Service grade;
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(2) political and special advisers; and
(3) the representative Government departments and job title of junior officials, in lieu 
of their names.
Further, the Government should commit to the full disclosure of all individuals who 
attended SAGE meetings—and their affiliations—within three months of the current 
SAGE being stood down, or by the end of 2021, whichever is the earlier. (Paragraph 57)
9. It is regrettable that full transparency was not achieved in time for the JBC’s 
inauguration on 1 June. We welcome the disclosure of the expert advisory boards 
supporting the JBC. Nevertheless, the Department of Health and Social Care 
(DHSC) has yet to commit to publish the outputs, including meeting papers and 
minutes, of all the JBC’s established boards. It would appear that the Government 
has not learned fully from the public concern resulting from the initial delays in 
publishing SAGE information. The Department of Health and Social Care should 
commit, within a month of this Report, to publish the relevant outputs—including 
terms of reference, meeting papers and meeting minutes—of the steering and advisory 
boards supporting the JBC. DHSC should also set out how regularly these boards will 
meet and when relevant papers can be expected to be in the public domain—preferably 
within a fortnight of each meeting. (Paragraph 64)
10. Given the frequent reporting of the views of SAGE advisers in the media—
particularly where these have diverged from decisions taken by the Government—
and the continued public interest in the evidence base underlying decisions made, 
we are satisfied for the most part that the demarcation between adviser and decision-
maker has remained intact. If we are to fully understand the extent to which the 
Government has been guided by scientific and medical expertise, then we must see 
the science advice that is reflected in the papers and meeting minutes published by 
SAGE. This advice must also be taken in the context of other advice and evidence 
submitted to Government—only then will the full justification for the Government’s 
actions be understood. The Government should publish the science advice given by 
the Government Chief Scientific Adviser and Chief Medical Officer for England to 
COBR and the Prime Minister to date, and commit to the disclosure of future SAGE 
advice within two months of it being given, or the policy being decided, whichever is 
the later. (Paragraph 69)
11. Transparency in the evidence behind Government decisions enables higher quality 
decision-making through scrutiny, and better understanding of the reasons for those 
decisions. While calls for the publication of SAGE evidence from this Committee 
and many others were eventually heeded, it is regrettable that a significant amount 
of time passed before a regular publication rhythm was established. However, we 
acknowledge that in emergencies, where evidence is subject to great uncertainty, 
careful thought must be given to the way information is communicated and 
presented, given the context at the time. During those crucial early weeks of the 
pandemic—in which important decisions were made by the Government—public 
understanding and scrutiny was hampered by a lack of transparency. For example, 
when details of the 16 March Imperial College report were made public, it was not 
known what other evidence was being considered by SAGE and the Government. 
It is regrettable that a repeat of this scenario occurred on 31 October, ahead of the 
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second national lockdown in England, where there was a delay in publishing the 
data behind the modelling used by SAGE. Presenting a graph to the public including 
a scenario of 4,000 deaths per day—based on out-of-date information and without 
a clearly marked source—risked, as indicated by the Office for Statistics Regulation, 
causing public confusion and undermining confidence in the statistics, and in our 
view, causing public alarm beyond what was justified. We agree with the assessment 
of the Office for Statistics Regulation and urge the Government and its advisers to 
ensure that analysis selected for public presentation meets high standards of rigour 
and relevance. (Paragraph 86)
12. It has been made clear to us that policy decisions throughout the coronavirus 
pandemic have not been based solely on medical and epidemiological science, but 
rather have been developed with a wide range of inputs that include scientific research 
and opinion. Nevertheless, as indicated by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, 
while the scientific analysis informing the Government’s interventions has enjoyed 
a great level of public exposure, the analysis and advice outside of SAGE (including 
economic and social considerations) have been “less visible”. It is disappointing 
that the Treasury had “not done a specific prediction or forecast of the restrictions” 
implemented, or those not pursued, but rather provided an “ongoing analysis” of 
economic factors, despite SAGE indicating that social and economic impacts should 
factor into such decisions. It is understandable that that these analyses are subject to 
significant uncertainty, however by analogy the epidemiological modelling published 
by SAGE, too, is uncertain and should not to be interpreted as a strict predictor of 
what will happen. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, publish the advice 
it has received on the potential indirect covid-19 impacts (e.g. economic, social and 
other health impacts) of the interventions it has undertaken, alongside the evidence 
base for that advice and should continue to commission such research. (Paragraph 87)
13. The public has shown a strong appetite for more information. The Government should 
attempt to quantify the four forms of health impacts identified by Professor Whitty. 
Further, it should consider whether it is possible to provide an analysis of—either 
consistently or on a sample basis—those who died with covid-19 as distinct from those 
who died from covid-19. (Paragraph 88)
14. As indicated by the Chief Medical Officer for England, the SAGE secretariat faced 
“huge pressure” in managing the monumental task of organising SAGE whilst 
adhering to the principles of transparent and scrutable scientific advice. We 
commend the efforts of officials in the Government Office for Science, the SAGE 
secretariat and independent advisers in their efforts to establish a regular rhythm of 
publicly available information, and hope that this is taken forward as a key learning 
for future emergencies. The Cabinet Office should work alongside the Government 
Office for Science to update SAGE guidance to incorporate the lessons learned for 
managing transparency during emergencies, taking account of:
a) the potential volume of information;
b) the publication and communication of non-peer-reviewed research informing 
SAGE;
c) the potential length of time over which SAGE is activated; and
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d) the potential impacts on public trust. (Paragraph 89)
15. We applaud the dedication with which the scientific community within the UK and 
globally have directly engaged with the public, in addition to their intensive studies of 
the coronavirus itself. We are also grateful to those within universities and research 
institutes for their efforts in supporting the clear and direct communication of the 
science of covid-19. These efforts have helped ensure that the trust of the British 
public in the strength of independent science advice has remained high during the 
pandemic, and we hope that these efforts are supported so that they may continue. 
We note, however, that a balance needs to be achieved so that Government decisions 
are not seen to be entirely science-led. The Government Office for Science should 
work with Government departments and public bodies, such as UK Research and 
Innovation, to identify the lessons to be learned from the Government’s communication 
of science—drawing also upon the experiences of researchers and their respective 
institutions. These lessons should be reflected within updated SAGE guidance, 
including a consideration of the support that SAGE participants may require for 
effective public communication and engagement during emergencies. (Paragraph 90)
Nature of the scientific advice to Government
16. We believe that a gap persists in the transparency of the advice that is given to 
the Government, outside of the auspices of SAGE, particularly on the topic of non-
medical impacts of the pandemic and related Government interventions. While 
this Committee is not advocating the establishment of an “economics SAGE”, we 
do note that SAGE’s remit covers the inclusion of numerous disciplines, including 
“scientific, technical, economic and legal” expertise. Further, it is entirely within the 
gift of SAGE to establish sub-groups to draw in other expertise as necessary. Whilst 
we have been assured that a Treasury official has been present at SAGE meetings, 
it has been stressed to us that SAGE does not issue economic advice and thus such 
advice must be received by Government through other avenues. The Government 
must, in response to this Report, set out how advice to central Government on the 
indirect effects (for instance impacts on mental health and social wellbeing, education 
and the economy) of covid-19, and the Government’s policy response to it, has been 
structured throughout the pandemic, and commit to the public disclosure of the 
individuals and institutions from which it has sought such advice and publication of 
relevant papers. (Paragraph 100)
17. Given the UK’s strengths in statistical analysis and data science, it is regrettable that 
poor data flows, delays in data-sharing agreements and a general lack of structuring 
and data integration across both the health and social care sectors have throttled 
timely data sharing and analysis. For example, it is unacceptable that detailed 
public health data was only made available to modellers from March. The potential 
consequences of this will undoubtedly include slower and less effective decision-
making. The establishment of the Joint Biosecurity Centre as an effort to centralise 
data flows to manage the pandemic gives some hope, although it is unfortunate that 
no central mechanism to coordinate data was in place at the start of the pandemic. 
However it will only be successful in this mission if it learns from the issues 
encountered in the early stages of the pandemic, such as those raised to us by SAGE, 
representatives of the health and social care sector and the academic and research 
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community. In response to this Report, the Department of Health and Social Care 
(DHSC) should set out an action plan that describes what efforts have been made, and 
will be made during the pandemic, to address the poor data access issues raised by 
the scientific community and SAGE and its sub-groups, including a consideration of:
i) agreements and incentives for data sharing;
ii) integration of data flows across the health and social care sectors, including 
public health bodies at the national and local levels; and
iii) integration of data flows across the health and social care systems of the four 
UK nations.
DHSC should also describe what role the Joint Biosecurity Centre will be given to 
make best use of such data flows and outline what support it will receive to achieve 
this. (Paragraph 109)
18. We are satisfied that the science advice informing the Government has drawn upon 
some of the best expertise that the UK—and indeed the world—has to offer. We 
acknowledge the initial dominance of modelling expertise on SAGE and believe 
this is a fair reflection of the lack of data at the beginning of the pandemic. We 
also note comments from the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care that 
SAGE expertise was broad enough and that advice from some disciplines—such as 
engineering—was given “quite separately”. We also appreciate that sub-groups and 
other advisory structures exist that may feed into Government decision-making, 
and that the composition of SAGE has evolved to incorporate a wider range of 
disciplines. (Paragraph 110)
Application of science expertise
19. The Government was too slow to increase testing capacity to the levels required 
to help contain the spread of the coronavirus. We have previously suggested that 
strategy was driven by the capacity available, rather than strategy driving the 
necessary increase in capacity. It was clear early in the year that Public Health 
England was not set up for the mass scale necessary for coronavirus testing. This 
lesson had previously been learned by countries who dealt with the MERS outbreak 
of 2015, and it is regrettable that it is a lesson that the UK did not heed in advance of 
the pandemic. (Paragraph 137)
20. The Government was slow to move once it realised that coronavirus testing required 
a rapid expansion and did not engage sufficiently with the wide array of scientific 
expertise available within the UK—particularly within our universities and research 
institutes. While we appreciate the complexities of such a feat, including the need 
to ensure health and safety guidelines are adhered to, it does not justify that many 
researchers who were willing and able to contribute went unheard. An overt initial 
focus on boosting capacity within established structures—namely PHE and NHS 
laboratories—clouded the exploration of a more decentralised avenue, such as that 
clearly employed by the Republic of Korea. As such, a significant and foreseeable 
opportunity was missed to prepare the UK for a potential pandemic situation. 
(Paragraph 138)
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21. The Committee will report separately and more fully on the test, trace and isolate 
system and the mass testing programme in due course. But in considering the role 
of science advice, and its influence on Government decisions, we are concerned 
by the continued lack of justification provided to the Committee by Public Health 
England for taking an initial centralised approach, and why a more decentralised 
approach—drawing, for example, on the experience of the Republic of Korea—has 
not been followed. (Paragraph 139)
22. The creation of NHS Test and Trace involves a budget of £22 billion for financial 
year 2020–21 and the justification for most of its spending being on the central part 
of the system, rather than through local public health teams, has not been clearly 
made. Concerns have also been raised about the inability of local public health 
teams to access timely information. This is particularly concerning given SAGE’s 
conclusion in September that the system, at that time, was “having a marginal 
impact on transmission”. (Paragraph 140)
23. The Government should: explain clearly the justification for taking a relatively 
centralised approach to test, trace and isolate; set out its assessment of the impact of 
the system on the spread of the virus since the outset, including on health outcomes; 
and review the balance between the local and national components of the system, 
including its value for money and effectiveness. The Government should set out the 
rationale and justification for, as the National Audit Office put it, the “unusual 
organisational relationship” that NHS Test and Trace has with the Department of 
Health and Social Care. (Paragraph 141)
24. Throughout the pandemic, the UK has relied on its own bespoke system of 
science advice and guidance on non-pharmaceutical interventions, while at the 
same time global-level guidance has been issued regularly by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). There have also been numerous opportunities to learn from 
the approaches undertaken by nations around the world. The UK’s policies on areas 
such as testing and tracing, the two-metre rule and the use of face coverings suggest 
that the Government’s approach has been to carve its own path between SAGE 
and WHO advice. We have heard that a “precautionary” approach was taken to 
social distancing in the UK—based on SAGE guidance—above the World Health 
Organisation’s recommendation of “at least 1 metre”. However, on face coverings a 
precautionary approach was not employed, and SAGE’s recommendations were not 
taken up until two months after they were made. In general, more lessons could have 
been applied from the experiences of other countries, particularly those which have 
dealt with previous coronavirus outbreaks (e.g. SARS and MERS). The Government 
should commit to review—before the end of 2021—the relationship between SAGE 
and expert advisory structures in other countries and the World Health Organisation, 
to understand where knowledge sharing may be improved during future emergencies. 
(Paragraph 149)
25. Given the importance of refining interventions to mitigate both impacts on public 
health and economic recovery, a review of social distancing measures came quite 
late. While the scientific approach quite rightly waits for the evidence before making 
a definitive recommendation, this often necessitates delay and may not produce 
conclusive results. The pandemic has demanded that policy be made and adapted 
on a faster timescale and in this instance the Government was too slow to respond. 
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The Government should employ a more adaptive approach to non–pharmaceutical 
interventions such as social distancing rules and commit to a review of the approach 
employed in the UK as compared with countries that dealt with the SARS and MERS 
outbreaks (such as the Republic of Korea), setting out the reasoning for differences in 
policy decisions. The outcome of this review should be published by the end of 2021. 
(Paragraph 150)
26. The development of vaccines and therapeutics is a policy area in which it is right 
that science must lead the way, so that there may be a high level of confidence that a 
rigorous approach has been taken towards safety and efficacy. From the beginning 
of the pandemic, the clear advice from experts was that significant investment and 
resource, at risk of failure, was required on many fronts to maximise the potential 
for success. The Government listened to this advice and we applaud the speed at 
which the Government implemented support for research and clinical trials, and 
took steps to secure the manufacture and procurement of potential vaccines. 
(Paragraph 158)
27. We acknowledge that a large part of the success to date into the development of 
covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics can be credited to lessons learned from previous 
outbreaks and efforts made to prepare for future crises. As further promising 
vaccine candidates and treatments come to light, other aspects of the Government’s 
pandemic preparedness, such as the logistics of a mass vaccination campaign, will 
be tested. (Paragraph 159)
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Formal minutes
Friday 24 April 2020
Mark Logan declared the following interest: he has a 50% beneficial share in Carnmoyne 
Private Residential home, Northern Ireland.
Thursday 17 December 2020
Members present:
Greg Clark in the Chair
Aaron Bell Andrew Griffith
Dawn Butler Carol Monaghan
Chris Clarkson Graham Stringer
Katherine Fletcher Zarah Sultana
Draft Report (The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice), proposed by the Chair, 
brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 159 read and agreed to.
Annex and Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 
134).
[Adjourned till Tuesday 12 January at 10.45am.
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
Wednesday 25 March 2020
Professor Neil Ferguson, Director, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease 
Analysis, Imperial College London Q1–37
Dr Richard Horton, Editor-in-Chief, The Lancet Panel Q38–46
Dr Melanie Saville, Director of Vaccine Research and Development, Coalition 
for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations; Professor Andrew Pollard, Professor of 
Paediatric Infection and Immunity, University of Oxford Q47–73
Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviser Q74–111
Professor Sharon Peacock, Director of the National Infection Service, Public 
Health England Q112–144
Wednesday 8 April 2020
Professor Gabriel Leung, Chair, Public Health Medicine, Hong Kong University; 
Dr Seon Kui Lee, Director, Division of Risk Assessment and International 
Cooperation, Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) Q145–155
Steve Bates, Chief Executive Officer, Bioindustry Association; Sir Paul Nurse, 
Director and Chief Executive, Francis Crick Institute Q156–172
Professor John Newton, Adviser on increasing Covid-19 testing capacity, HM 
Government; Kathy Hall, Director of Covid-19 testing strategy, Department of 
Health and Social Care; Professor Stephen Powis, National Medical Director, 
NHS England Q173–211
Thursday 16 April 2020
Professor Graham Medley, Professor of Infectious Disease Modelling, London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; Dr James Rubin, Reader in the 
Psychology of Emerging Health Risks, Kings College London Q212–247
Professor Xihong Lin, Professor of Biostatistics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of 
Public Health; Professor Dr. Clemens Fuest, President, German Institute for 
Economic Research; Professor Dr. Herwig Ostermann, Executive Director, 
Austrian Public Health Institute Q248–268
Friday 24 April 2020
Dr Frank Atherton, Chief Medical Officer for Wales; Dr Michael McBride, Chief 
Medical Officer for Northern Ireland; Dr Gregor Smith, Interim Chief Medical 
Officer for Scotland; Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England, 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Department of Health and Social Care; Pete Wishart 
MP, Chair-Elect, Scottish Affairs Select Committee Q269–339
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Tuesday 28 April 2020
Professor Danny Altmann, Professor of Immunology, Imperial College London, 
Spokesperson, British Society for Immunology; Professor Susan Michie, 
Professor of Health Psychology, University College London Q340–371
Matthew Gould CMG MBE, Chief Executive Officer, NHSX; Professor Lilian 
Edwards, Professor of Law, Innovation and Society, Newcastle Law School; 
Professor Christophe Fraser, Senior Group Leader in Pathogen Dynamics, 
University of Oxford Big Data Institute Q372–422
Thursday 7 May 2020
Professor Sir Ian Diamond, National Statistician; Professor John Edmunds 
OBE, Professor of Infectious Disease Modelling, London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine Q423–457
Professor David Peters, Chair of the Department of International Health, John 
Hopkins University; Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter, Chair of the Winton 
Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, University of Cambridge Q458–488
Wednesday 13 May 2020
Professor Alan Penn, Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government; Osama Rahman, Chief Scientific Adviser and Director of 
Analysis, Department for Education Q489–540
Professor Phil Blythe, Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Transport; 
Professor John Aston, Chief Scientific Adviser, Home Office Q541–624
Friday 22 May 2020
Professor John Newton, Director of Health Improvement, Public Health England; 
Professor Yvonne Doyle, Medical Director and Director for Health Protection, 
Public Health England Q625–704
Professor Andrew Curran, Chief Scientific Adviser, Health and Safety Executive; 
Professor Catherine Noakes, Professor of Environmental Engineering for 
Buildings, University of Leeds Q705–757
Friday 5 June 2020
Professor Carol Propper, Professor of Economics, Imperial College London; 
Professor John Kay, Economist and Fellow in Economics, St John’s College, 
University of Oxford; Professor James Poterba, Mitsui Professor of Economics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Q758–787
Professor John Loughhead, Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy; Phillip Duffy, Chief Scientific Adviser, HM 
Treasury Q788–821
Wednesday 10 June 2020
Professor Mark Woolhouse OBE, Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, 
University of Edinburgh; Professor Johan Giesecke, Former State Epidemiologist 
for Sweden and Professor Emeritus, Karolinska Institute Q822–865
85 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 
Professor Neil Ferguson, Professor of Mathematical Biology, Imperial College 
London; Professor Matt Keeling, Professor of Mathematics and Life Sciences, 
University of Warwick; Dr Nicholas Davies, Research Fellow in Mathematical 
Modelling, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Q866–943
Wednesday 1 July 2020
Professor Sarah Gilbert, Professor of Vaccinology, University of Oxford; Kate 
Bingham, Chair, UK Government Vaccine Taskforce; Professor Sir John Bell, 
Regius Professor of Medicine, University of Oxford Q944–994
Professor Jonathan Van-Tam, Deputy Chief Medical Officer and Lead, UK 
Government Therapeutics Taskforce, Department of Health and Social Care; Dr 
Jonathan Sheffield, COVID-19 Research Operations Director, National Institute 
for Health Research Q995–1036
Thursday 16 July 2020
Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviser Q1037–1159
Tuesday 21 July 2020
Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, 
Department of Health and Social Care; Sir Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Health and Social Care Q1160–1258
Thursday 17 September 2020
Professor Carl Heneghan, Professor of Evidence-Based Medicine & Director, 
Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, University of Oxford; Dr Thomas 
Waite, Director, Health Protection, Joint Biosecurity Centre; Professor Sylvia 
Richardson, Director, MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge Institute of Public 
Health, University of Cambridge Q1259–1291
Baroness Harding of Winscombe, Interim Executive Chair, National Institute for 
Health Protection; Simon Thompson, Managing Director of the NHS COVID-19 
App, NHS Test and Trace; Dr Susan Hopkins, Chief Medical Advisor, NHS Test 
and Trace; Lord Bethell, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of 
Health and Social Care Q1292–1432
Tuesday 3 November 2020
Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England; Sir Patrick Vallance, 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser; The Lord Patel KT, Chair of Science and 
Technology Committee, House of Lords Q1433–1564
 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice 86
Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
C numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 ABPI (The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry) (C190098)
2 Academy of Medical Sciences (C190102)
3 Apple (C190017)
4 BIVDA (C190082)
5 Barr, Dr G D (C190056)
6 Battye, Rose (C190040)
7 Biochemical Society (C190088)
8 Blott, Richard (C190039) and (C190049)
9 British Pharmacological Society (C190075)
10 British Society for Immunology (C190093)
11 Care England (C190021)
12 Clark, Dr Andre (C190008)
13 Centre for Genomic Pathogen Surveillance (C190090)
14 Cheng, CEO Andersen (CEO, Nomidio & Post-Quantum) (C190028)
15 Cole, Dr Jennifer (C190002)
16 Daniels, Professor James (Former DfiD Quarantine Manager, Ebola, VQF Hastings, 
SIERRA LEONE, WHH Dfid Funded) (C190051)
17 Davies, Nick (Research Fellow in Mathematical Modelling, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine) (C190037)
18 Department of Health and Social Care (C190057) and (C190112)
19 Earlham Institute (C190024)
20 Emergent BioSolutions Inc. (C190058)
21 Evans, Ken (C190100)
22 Everbridge (C190019)
23 Faculty of Pharmaceutical Medicine (RCP UK) (C190091)
24 Fenton-O, Mark (C190009)
25 Fight for Freedom: Stand with Hong Kong (C190052)
26 Finlayson, Ashley (C190060)
27 Ferguson OBE, Professor Neil (Professor of Mathematical Biology, Imperial College 
London) (C190041)
28 Global Disability Innovation Hub (C190104)
29 Gonzalez-Rodriguez, Dr Jose (Associate Professor in Analytical Chemistry, University 
of Lincoln) (C190078)
30 Google (C190015)
31 Gough, Professor David (Director, EPPI-Centre, University College London) (C190097)
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32 Guinchard, Dr Audrey; and Dr Subhajit Basu (C190029)
33 Head, Mr Michael (Senior Research Fellow in Global Health Clinical Informatics 
Research Unit, Faculty of Medicine, University of Southampton) (C190067)
34 Health Research Authority (C190096)
35 Health and Safety Executive (C190033)
36 Hebard, Peter (Covid Task Force Coordinator, IMechE Covid Task Force) (C190042) 
and (C190054)
37 Hilton, Mr Samuel (Research Affiliate, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk); Toby 
Ord (Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute); and Haydn Belfield 
(Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk) (C190076)
38 Home Office (C190036)
39 Imperial College London (C190038)
40 Institute for Life Sciences, University of Southampton (C190071)
41 Institute of Development Studies (C190089)
42 Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine (C190087)
43 Institution of Chemical Engineers; and International Society for Pharmaceutical 
Engineering UK Affiliate (ISPE UK) (C190068)
44 Keeling, Professor Matt (Professor, University of Warwick) (C190032)
45 Kime, Mr David Allan (C190001)
46 Kolstoe, Dr Simon (Senior Lecturer in Evidence Based Healthcare, and independent 
chair PHE Regulation & Governance Group, University of Portsmouth/PHE) (C190086)
47 Lawson, Dr Aaron (Lecturer in Environmental Health, Ulster University; and 
Contracted Research Associate, Safefood Ireland (The Food Safety Promotion 
Board)) (C190006)
48 Lewis, Dr Gregory (C190107)
49 Lin, Professor Xihong (Professor of Biostatistics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public 
Health) (C190013)
50 Lord Dowding Fund for Humane Research (C190095)
51 Loughhead, Professor John (Chief Scientific Adviser & Director General, Department 
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) (C190046)
52 MacKay, Prof Robert (C190027)
53 Maroso, Mr Gabriele (Co-Founder Associate, Onfido) (C190014)
54 McAllister, Hayden (C190069)
55 National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research Unit in 
Emerging and Zoonotic Infections; University of Oxford, Nuffield Department of 
Primary Care Health Sciences; and University of Liverpool, Institute of Infection and 
Global Health (C190084)
56 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (C190092)
57 National Physical Laboratory (C190094)
58 Newton, Professor John (Director of Health Improvement, Public Health England; 
and Government’s Government adviser on increasing Covid-19 testing capacity, 
Public Health England) (C190034)
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59 Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle and the Centre 
for a Spacefaring Civilization; Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria 
at Newcastle and the Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization; Northumbria Law 
School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle and the Centre for a Spacefaring 
Civilization; and Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
and the Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization (C190059)
60 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (C190045) and (C190062)
61 Powis, Professor Stephen (National Medical Director, NHS England and NHS 
Improvement) (C190043)
62 Public Health England (C190035)
63 RJALogix (C190108)
64 Richardson, Professor Sylvia (Director, MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge Institute of 
Public Health, University of Cambridge) (C190113)
65 Riley, Keith (C190099)
66 Roche Products Ltd (C190085)
67 Royal Academy of Engineering (C190101)
68 Royal Society of Chemistry (C190064)
69 Royal Society of Edinburgh (C190103)
70 SC Johnson Professional (C190070)
71 Safer Medicines Trust (C190079)
72 Schofield, Dr Stan (C190012)
73 Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy 
Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, 
University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, University of 
Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business 
School; and Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School 
(C190081)
74 Shanks, Professor Thomas (C190010)
75 Simpson, Mr Karl (Director, JKS Bioscience Limited) (C190047)
76 Smith, Sam (coordinator, medConfidential) (C190016)
77 Snell, Mr Geoff (C190074)
78 Society for Applied Microbiology (C190083)
79 Taylor, Mr Christopher Marc (Chair, ISRCTN registry) (C190077)
80 techUK (C190022)
81 The Francis Crick Institute (C190072)
82 The Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub (C190106)
83 The Physiological Society (C190061)
84 The Royal Society (C190110)
85 Thimbleby, Prof Harold (C190005)
86 Tissue Solutions (C190053)
87 Tyrzyk, Mr Roger (Country Manager, IDnow) (C190018)
88 UCL Institute for Healthcare Engineering (C190105)
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89 UK Collaborative on Development Research (UKCDR) (C190080)
90 UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering 
Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network 
Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; and UK Reproducibility 
Network Steering Group (C190063)
91 UK Research and Innovation (C190073)
92 Universities Policy Engagement Network (UPEN) (C190065)
93 University College London (C190055)
94 Vaghjiani, Nikita (Public Affairs Adviser, Royal College of Physicians) (C190007) and 
(C190025)
95 Vallance, Sir Patrick (C190111)
96 Veneklasen, Mr. Ethan (Head of Advocacy and Communications, ID2020) (C190031)
97 Watt, Dr Andrew (C190109)
98 Wellcome Sanger Institute (C190066)
99 Wilby, Professor Alvin (C190050)
100 Yoti (C190044)
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